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Abstract 
 
We quantify agglomeration spillovers by estimating the impact of the opening of a large manufacturing 
plant on the total factor productivity (TFP) of incumbent plants in the same county. We use the location 
rankings of profit-maximizing firms to compare incumbent plants in the county where the new plant 
ultimately chose to locate (the “winning county”), with incumbent plants in the runner-up county (the 
“losing county”). Incumbent plants in winning and losing counties have economically and statistically 
similar trends in TFP in the 7 years before the new plant opening. Five years after the new plant opening, 
TFP of incumbent plants in winning counties is 12% higher than TFP of incumbent plants in losing 
counties. Consistent with some theories of agglomeration economies, this effect is larger for incumbent 
plants that share similar labor and technology pools with the new plant. We also find evidence of a 
relative increase in skill-adjusted labor costs in winning counties, indicating that the ultimate effect on 
profits is smaller than the direct increase in productivity.  
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Introduction 
In most countries, economic activity is spatially concentrated. While some of this concentration is 
explained by the presence of natural advantages that constrain specific productions to specific locations, 
Ellison and Glaeser (1999) and others argue that natural advantages alone cannot account for the observed 
degree of agglomeration. Spatial concentration is particularly remarkable for industries that produce 
nationally traded goods, because the areas where economic activity is concentrated are typically 
characterized by high costs of labor and land. Since at least Marshall (1890), economists have speculated 
that this concentration of economic activity may be explained by cost or productivity advantages enjoyed 
by firms when they locate near other firms. The potential sources of agglomeration advantages include: 
cheaper and faster supply of intermediate goods and services; proximity to workers or consumers; better 
quality of worker-firm matches in thicker labor markets; lower risk of unemployment for workers and 
lower risk of unfilled vacancies for firms following idiosyncratic shocks; and knowledge spillovers.
1
The possibility of documenting productivity advantages through agglomeration is tantalizing, 
because it could provide insights into a series of important questions.  Why are firms that produce 
nationally traded goods willing to locate in cities like New York, San Francisco, or London, that are 
characterized by extraordinary production costs? In general, why do cities exist and what explains their 
historical development? Why do income differences persist across regions and countries?  
  
Beside  an  obvious interest for urban and growth economists, the existence of agglomeration 
spillovers has tremendous practical relevance. Increasingly, local governments compete by offering 
substantial subsidies to industrial plants to locate within their jurisdictions. The main economic rationale 
for these incentives depends on whether the attraction of new plants  generates agglomeration 
externalities. In the absence of positive externalities, it is difficult to justify the use of taxpayer money for 
subsidies based on economic efficiency grounds. The optimal magnitude of incentives depends on the 
magnitude of agglomerations spillovers, if they exist.
2
The existence and exact magnitude of agglomeration spillovers are considered open questions by 
many,  despite their enormous theoretical and practical relevance.  To date, there are two primary 
approaches in testing for spillovers. The first tests for an unequal geographic distribution of firms. These 
“dartboard” style tests reveal that firms are spread unevenly and that coagglomeration rates are higher 
between industries that are economically similar (Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr, 2009). This approach is 
  
                                                 
1 The literature on this topic is enormous, and cannot be fully summarized here. Examples include, but are not 
limited to, Lucas (1988), Krugman (1991a, 1991b), Henderson (2001, 2003), Davis and Henderson (2004), Davis 
and Weinstein (2002), Henderson and Black (1999), Rosenthal and Stange (2001, 2004), Duranton and Puga (2004), 
Audretsch and Feldman, (1996, 2004), Moretti (2004a, 2004b, 2004c), Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (2002), Glaeser 
(1999), Ottaviano and Thisse (2004).  
2 We discuss in more detail the policy implications of local subsidies in Greenstone and Moretti (2004). See also 
Card, Hallock, and Moretti (2007) and Glaeser (2001). 2 
 
based on equilibrium location decisions and does not provide a direct measure of spillovers. 
The second approach uses micro data to assess whether firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) is 
higher when similar firms are located nearby. A notable example is Henderson (2003), which estimates 
plant level production functions for machinery and high-tech industries as a function of the scale of other 
plants in the same and different industries.
3
This paper tests for and quantifies agglomeration spillovers by estimating how the productivity of 
incumbent manufacturing plants changes when  a large plant opens in their county.  We estimate 
augmented Cobb-Douglas production functions that allow TFP to depend on the presence of the new 
plant, using plant-level data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures. Because the new plant's location 
decision is made to maximize profits, the chosen county is likely to differ substantially from an average or 
randomly chosen county, both at the time of opening and in future periods. Valid estimates of the plant 
opening’s spillover effect require the identification of a county that is identical to the county where the 
plant decided to locate in the determinants of incumbent plants’ TFP. These determinants are likely to 
include factors that affect the new plant’s TFP.  
 The challenge for both approaches is that firms base their 
location decisions on where their profits will be highest, and this could be due to spillovers, natural 
advantages, or other cost shifters. A causal estimate of the magnitude of spillovers requires a solution to 
this problem of identification. 
This paper’s solution is to rely on the reported location rankings of profit-maximizing firms to 
identify a valid counterfactual for what would have happened to incumbent plants’ TFP in the absence of 
the plant opening.  These rankings come from the corporate real estate journal Site Selection, which 
includes a regular feature titled “Million Dollar Plants” that describes how a large plant decided where to 
locate. When firms are considering where to open a large plant, they typically begin by considering 
dozens of possible locations. They subsequently narrow the list to roughly 10 sites, among which 2 or 3 
finalists are selected. The “Million Dollar Plants” articles report the county that the plant ultimately chose 
(i.e., the "winner"), as well as the one or two  runner-up counties (i.e., the "losers"). The losers are 
counties that have survived a long selection process, but narrowly lost the competition. 
The identifying assumption is that the incumbent plants in the losing counties  form a valid 
counterfactual for the incumbents in the winning counties, after conditioning on differences in pre-
existing trends, plant fixed effects, industry-by-year fixed effects, and other control variables. Compared 
to the rest of the country, winning counties have higher rates of growth in income, population, and labor 
force participation. But compared to losing counties in the years before the opening of the new plant, 
winning counties have similar trends in most economic variables. This finding is consistent with both our 
                                                 
3  Moretti (2004b) takes a similar approach to estimate agglomeration externalities generated by human capital 
spillovers.  3 
 
presumption that the average county is not a credible counterfactual and our identifying assumption that 
the losers form a valid counterfactual for the winners.  
We first measure the effect of the new Million Dollar Plant (MDP) on total factor productivity of 
all incumbent manufacturing plants in winning counties. In the 7 years before the MDP opened, we find 
statistically equivalent trends in TFP for incumbent plants in winning and losing counties. This finding 
supports the validity of the identifying assumption.  
After the MDP opened, incumbent plants in winning counties experienced a sharp relative 
increase in TFP.  Five years later, the MDP opening is associated with a 12% relative increase in 
incumbent plants’ TFP.
4
Having found evidence in favor of the existence of agglomeration spillovers, we then try to shed 
some light on the possible mechanisms. We follow Moretti (2004b) and Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2009) 
and investigate whether the magnitude of the spillovers depends on economic linkages between the 
incumbent plant and the MDP. Specifically, we test whether incumbents that are geographically and 
economically linked to the MDP experience larger spillovers, relative to incumbents that are 
geographically close but economically distant from the MDP. We use several measures of economic links 
including input and output flows, measures of the degree of sharing of labor pools, and measures of 
technological linkages.
 This effect is statistically significant and economically substantial: on average, 
incumbent plants’ output in winning counties is $430 million higher 5 years later (relative to incumbents 
in losing counties), holding constant inputs. A 12% increase in TFP is equivalent to moving a county 
from the 10th percentile of the county-level TFP distribution to the 27th percentile; alternatively, it is 
equivalent to a 0.6 standard deviation increase in the distribution of county TFP.  We interpret this finding 
as evidence of large productivity spillovers generated by increased agglomeration. 
5
We find that spillovers are larger for incumbent plants in industries that share worker flows with 
the MDP industry. A one standard deviation increase in our measure of worker transitions is associated 
with a 7 percentage point increase in the magnitude of the spillover.  Similarly, the measures of 
technological linkages indicate statistically meaningful increases in the spillover effect. Surprisingly, we 
find little support for the importance of input and output flows in determining the magnitude of the 
spillover. Overall, this evidence provides support for the notion that spillovers occur between firms that 
share workers and use similar technologies.  
  
The estimated productivity gains experienced by winning counties are highly heterogeneous, with 
some counties experiencing very large benefits and other counties experiencing much smaller benefits or 
                                                 
4  Notably, naïve estimates that control for observables but do not use the MDP research design find negative 
productivity effects. 
5 We are deeply indebted to Glenn Ellison, Edward Glaeser, and William Kerr for providing their data for five of 
these measures of economic distance. 4 
 
even aggregate losses. This implies that local government competition over subsidies may encourage 
efficient matching between large TFP-producing plants and locations. (By contrast, if the benefits of 
attracting a new plant were homogeneous, then local government subsidies may benefit that locality but 
decrease national welfare by bidding away all the benefit from attracting a new plant. See, for example, 
Glaeser 2008). Heterogeneity in the spillover also implies that risk-adverse local governments may be less 
willing to subsidize new plant openings than indicated by the average gains. 
To interpret the results, we set out a straightforward Roback (1982) style model that incorporates 
spillovers between producers and derives an equilibrium allocation of firms and workers across locations. 
In the model, the entry of a new firm produces spillovers. This leads to entry of firms that are interested in 
gaining access to the spillover. The original plant opening and subsequent new entry leads to competition 
for inputs, so incumbent firms face higher prices for labor, land, and other local inputs. In the model, 
firms produce nationally traded goods and cannot raise output prices in response to higher input prices. 
Thus, the long-run equilibrium is obtained when the value of the increase in output due to spillovers is 
equal to the increased costs of production due to higher input prices. 
Consistent with these predictions, we find increases in quality-adjusted labor costs following 
MDP openings. These higher wages are consistent with the documented increase in economic activity in 
the winning counties and with a local labor supply curve that is upward sloping (at least in the medium 
run). We also find positive net entry in winning counties, which the model predicts will occur if there are 
sufficiently large positive spillovers to generate an overall increase in profitability. 
Because the increase in labor costs is county-wide, while the productivity spillovers decline in 
economic distance, incumbent firms that are economically further away may become less profitable. In 
the long-run, this process may result in increased agglomeration of similar plants in each MDP location. 
The interaction between spillovers and input costs may therefore help explain the existence of industrial 
clusters, a pervasive feature of the spatial distribution of economic activity.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a simple model. Section II 
discusses the identification strategy.  Section III introduces the data sources. Section IV presents the 
econometric model. Sections V describes the empirical results, and Section VI explores their robustness. 
Section VII discusses the interpretation of the results. Section VIII concludes. 
 
I. Theories of Agglomeration and Theoretical Framework 
We are interested in identifying how the opening of a new plant in a county affects the 
productivity, profits, and input use of existing plants in the same county. We begin by reviewing theories 
of agglomeration. We then present a simple theoretical framework that guides the subsequent empirical 
exercise and aids in interpreting the results.  5 
 
A. Theories of Agglomeration  
Economic activity is geographically concentrated (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997).  What are the 
forces that can explain such agglomeration of economic activity?  Here we summarize five  possible 
reasons for agglomeration, and briefly discuss what each of them implies for the relationship between 
productivity and the density of economic activity. 
(1) First, it is possible that firms (and workers) are attracted to areas with a high concentration of 
other firms (and other workers) by the size of the labor market. There are at least two different reasons 
why larger labor markets may be attractive. First, if there are search frictions and jobs and workers are 
heterogeneous, then a worker-firm match will be on average more productive in areas where there are 
many firms offering jobs and many workers looking for jobs.
6 Second, large labor markets may provide 
insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, either on the firm side or on the worker side (Krugman 1991a). If 
firms experience idiosyncratic and unpredictable demand shocks that lead to layoffs and moving/hiring is 
costly for workers/firms,  then thicker labor markets will reduce the probability that a worker is 
unemployed and a firm has unfilled vacancies.
7
These two hypotheses have different implications for the relationship between the concentration 
of economic activity and productivity. If the size of the labor market leads only to better worker-firm 
matches, we should see that firms located in denser areas are more productive than otherwise identical 
firms located in less dense areas. The exact form of this productivity gain depends on the shape of the 
production function.
 
8
On the other hand, if the only effect of thickness in the  labor market is a lower risk of 
unemployment for workers and a lower risk of unfilled vacancies for firms, there should  not be 
differences in productivity between dense and less dense areas. Unlike the case of improved matching 
described above, the production function does not change: for the same set of labor and capital inputs, the 
output of firms in denser areas should be similar to the output of firms in less  dense areas.  While 
productivity would not vary, wages would vary across areas depending on the thickness of the labor 
  
                                                 
6 For a related point in a different context, see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2005). 
7 A third alternative hypothesis has to do with spillovers that arise because of endogenous capital accumulation. For 
example, in Acemoglu (1996), plants have more capital and better technology in areas where the number of skilled 
workers is larger. If firms and workers find each other via random matching and breaking the match is costly, 
externalities will arise naturally even without learning or technological externalities. The intuition is simple. The 
privately optimal amount of skills depends on the amount of physical capital a worker expects to use. The privately 
optimal amount of physical capital depends on the number of skilled workers. If the number of skilled workers in a 
city increases, firms in that city, expecting to employ these workers, will invest more. Because search is costly, some 
of the workers end up working with more physical capital and earn more than similar workers in other cities. 
8 For example, it is possible that the productivities of both capital and labor benefit from the improved match in 
denser areas.  It is also possible that the improved match caused by a larger labor market benefits only labor 
productivity. This has different implications for the relative use of labor and capital, but total factor productivity will 
be higher regardless.  6 
 
market, although the exact effect of density on wages is a priori ambiguous.
9
(2) A second reason why the concentration of economic activity may be beneficial has to do with 
transportation costs (Krugman 1991a and 1991b, Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2003). Because in this paper we 
focus on firms that produce nationally traded goods, transportation costs of finished products are unlikely 
to be the relevant cost in this paper’s setting. Only a small fraction of buyers of the final product is likely 
to be located in the same area as our manufacturing plants. The relevant costs are the transportation costs 
of suppliers of local services and local intermediate goods. Firms located in denser areas are likely to 
enjoy cheaper and faster delivery of local services and local intermediate goods. For example, a high-tech 
firm that needs a specialized technician to fix a machine is likely to get service more quickly and at lower 
cost if it is located in Silicon Valley than in the Nevada desert.  
 This change in relative 
factor prices will change the relative use of labor and capital. 
This type of agglomeration spillover does not imply that the production function varies as a 
function of the density of economic activity: for the same set of labor and capital inputs, the output of 
firms in denser areas should be similar to the output of firms in less dense areas. However, production 
costs should be lower in denser areas.  
  (3) A third reason why the concentration of economic activity may be beneficial has to do with 
knowledge spillovers. There are at least two different versions of this hypothesis. First, economists and 
urban planners have long speculated that the sharing of knowledge and skills through formal and informal 
interaction may generate positive production externalities across workers.
10 Empirical evidence indicates 
that this type of spillover may be important in some high-tech industries. For example, patent citations are 
more likely to come from the same state or metropolitan area as the originating patent (Jaffe et al. 1993). 
Saxenian (1994) argues that geographical proximity of high-tech firms in Silicon Valley is associated 
with a more efficient flow of new ideas and ultimately causes faster innovation.
11
  If density of economic activity results in intellectual externalities, this form of agglomeration 
would lead to higher productivity. In particular, we should see that firms located in denser areas are more 
 Second, it is also 
possible that proximity results in sharing of information on new technologies and therefore leads to faster 
technology adoption. This type of social learning phenomenon applied to technology adoption was first 
proposed by Griliches (1958). 
                                                 
9 Its sign depends on the relative magnitude of the compensating differential that workers are willing to pay for 
lower risk of unemployment (generated by an increase in labor supply in denser areas) and the cost savings that 
firms experience due to lower risk of unfilled vacancies (generated by an increase in labor demand in denser areas). 
10 See, for example, Marshall (1890), Lucas (1988), Jovanovic and Rob (1989), Grossman and Helpman (1991), 
Saxenian (1994), Glaeser (1999), and Moretti (2004a, 2004b and 2004c).  
11 The entry decisions of new biotechnology firms in a city depend on the stock of outstanding scientists there, as 
measured by the number of relevant academic publications (Zucker et al., 1998). Moretti (2004b) finds stronger 
human capital spillovers between pairs of firms in the same city that are economically or technologically closer. 7 
 
productive than otherwise identical firms located in less dense areas. As with the search model, this 
higher productivity could benefit both labor and capital, or only one of the two factors, depending on the 
form of the production function. On the other hand, if density of economic activity only results in faster 
technology adoption and the price of new technologies reflects their higher productivity, there should be 
no relationship between productivity and density, after properly controlling for the quality of capital.  
  (4) It is possible that firms concentrate spatially not because of any technological spillover, but 
because local amenities valued by workers are concentrated. For example, skilled workers may prefer 
certain amenities more than unskilled workers. This would lead firms that employ relatively more skilled 
workers to concentrate in locations where these amenities are available. In this case, we should not see 
any difference in productivity between dense areas and less dense areas, although we should see 
differences in wages that reflect the compensating differential. 
  (5) Finally, spatial concentration of some industries may be explained by the presence of natural 
advantages. For example, the oil industry is concentrated in a limited number of states because those 
states have the most accessible oil fields. Similarly, the wine industry is concentrated in California due to 
suitable weather and land.  For some manufacturing productions, the presence of a  harbor may be 
important. Natural advantages imply that firms located in areas with a high concentration of similar firms 
are more productive, but of course this correlation has nothing to do with agglomeration spillovers. Since 
most natural advantages are fixed over time, this explanation is not particularly relevant for our empirical 
estimates, which exploit variation over time in agglomeration.  
 
B. A Simple Model 
We begin by considering the case where incumbent firms are homogenous in size and 
technology. Later we consider what happens when incumbent firms are heterogeneous. Throughout the 
paper, we focus on the case of factor-neutral spillovers. 
 (i) Homogeneous Incumbents. We assume that all incumbent firms use a production technology 
that uses labor, capital, and land to produce a nationally traded good whose price is fixed and is 
normalized to 1. Incumbent firms choose their amount of labor, 𝐿𝐿, capital, 𝐾𝐾, and land, 𝑇𝑇, to maximize 
the following expression: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾,𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾,𝑇𝑇) −  𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾 − 𝑞𝑞𝑇𝑇 
where 𝑤𝑤, 𝑟𝑟, and 𝑞𝑞 are input prices and 𝐴𝐴 is a productivity shifter (TFP). Specifically, 𝐴𝐴 includes all 
factors that affect the productivity of labor, capital, and land equally, such as technology and 
agglomeration spillovers, if they exist. In particular, to explicitly allow for agglomeration effects, we 
allow 𝐴𝐴 to depend on the density of economic activity in an area: 
(1)            𝐴𝐴 = 𝐴𝐴(𝑁𝑁) 8 
 
where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of firms that are active in a county, and all counties have equal size. We define 
factor-neutral agglomeration spillovers as the case where 𝐴𝐴  increases in 𝑁𝑁:  𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ > 0.  If instead 
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ = 0, we say that there are no factor-neutral agglomeration spillovers. 
  Let 𝐿𝐿∗(𝑤𝑤,𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞) be the optimal level of labor inputs, given the prevailing wage, cost of capital, and 
cost of industrial land. Similarly, let 𝐾𝐾∗(𝑤𝑤,𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞) and 𝑇𝑇∗(𝑤𝑤,𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞) be the optimal level of capital and land, 
respectively. In equilibrium, 𝐿𝐿∗, 𝐾𝐾∗, and 𝑇𝑇∗ are set so that the marginal product of each of the three 
factors is equal to its price.  
We assume that capital is internationally traded, so its price does not depend on local demand or 
supply conditions. However, we allow for the price of labor and land to depend on local economic 
conditions. In particular, we allow the supply of labor and land to be less than infinitely elastic at the 
county level. 
 We attribute the upward sloping labor supply curve to the existence of moving costs. As in the 
standard Roback (1982) model, we assume that workers’ indirect utility depends on wages and cost of 
housing, and that in equilibrium workers are indifferent across locations. Workers are mobile across 
locations, but unlike the standard Roback (1982) model we allow for moving costs. For simplicity, we 
ignore labor supply decisions within a given location and assume that all residents provide a fixed amount 
of labor. 
To illustrate this, consider that there are 𝑚𝑚 workers in county 𝑐𝑐 before the opening of the new 
plant. In particular, 𝑚𝑚 is such that, given the distribution of wages and the housing costs across localities, 
the marginal worker in another county is indifferent between moving to county 𝑐𝑐 and staying. When a 
new plant opens in county 𝑐𝑐, wages there start rising, and some workers find it optimal to move to county 
𝑐𝑐. The number of workers who move, and therefore the slope of the labor supply function, depend on the 
shape of the mobility cost function. Let 𝑤𝑤(𝑁𝑁) be the inverse of the reduced-form labor supply function 
that links the number of firms, 𝑁𝑁, active in a county to the local nominal wage level, 𝑤𝑤.  
Similarly, we allow the supply of industrial land to be less than infinitely elastic at the county 
level.  For example, it is possible that the supply of land is fixed because of  geography  or  land-use 
regulations. Alternatively, it may not be completely fixed, but it is possible that the best industrial land 
has already been developed, so that the marginal land is of decreasing quality or more expensive to 
develop. Irrespective of the reason, we call 𝑞𝑞(𝑁𝑁) the inverse of the reduced form land supply function 
that links the number of firms, 𝑁𝑁, to the price of land, 𝑞𝑞. We can therefore write the equilibrium level of 
profits, 𝗱𝗱∗, as  
            𝗱𝗱∗ = 𝑓𝑓�𝐴𝐴(𝑁𝑁),𝐿𝐿∗�𝑤𝑤(𝑁𝑁),𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞(𝑁𝑁)�,𝐾𝐾∗�𝑤𝑤(𝑁𝑁),𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞(𝑁𝑁)�,𝑇𝑇∗�𝑤𝑤(𝑁𝑁),𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞(𝑁𝑁)��     
−  𝑤𝑤(𝑁𝑁)𝐿𝐿∗�𝑤𝑤(𝑁𝑁),𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞(𝑁𝑁)� −  𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾∗�𝑤𝑤(𝑁𝑁),𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞(𝑁𝑁)� −  𝑞𝑞(𝑁𝑁)𝑇𝑇∗�𝑤𝑤(𝑁𝑁),𝑟𝑟,𝑞𝑞(𝑁𝑁)� 9 
 
where we now make explicit the fact that TFP, wages, and land prices depend on the number of firms 
active in a county.  
  Consider the total derivative of incumbents’ profits with respect to a change in the number of 
firms: 
             (2)     𝑑𝑑𝗱𝗱∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁 = ⁄ (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 ⁄ × 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ )
+ 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ {[𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 ⁄ (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 ⁄ − 𝑤𝑤) − 𝐿𝐿∗] + [𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 ⁄ (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾 ⁄ − 𝑟𝑟)] + [𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 ⁄ (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇 ⁄ − 𝑞𝑞)]}
+ 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ {[𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 ⁄ (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿 ⁄ − 𝑤𝑤)] + [𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 ⁄ (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾 ⁄ − 𝑟𝑟)] + [𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 ⁄ (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇 ⁄ − 𝑞𝑞) − 𝑇𝑇∗]} 
If all firms are price takers and all factors are paid their marginal product, equation (2) simplifies 
considerably and can be written as: 
(3)   𝑑𝑑𝗱𝗱∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁 = ⁄ (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 ⁄ × 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ ) − [𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ 𝐿𝐿∗ + 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ 𝑇𝑇∗]. 
Equation (3) makes clear that the effect of an increase in 𝑁𝑁 is the sum of two opposite effects. First, if 
there are positive spillovers, the productivity of all factors increases. In equation (3), this effect on TFP is 
represented by the first  term,  (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 ⁄ × 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ ).  This effect is unambiguously positive, because it 
allows an incumbent firm to produce more output using the same amount of inputs. Formally, 𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 ⁄ > 0 
by assumption and, if there are positive spillovers, 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ > 0.  
The second term, −[𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ 𝐿𝐿∗ + 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ 𝑇𝑇∗], represents the negative effect from increases in the 
cost of production, specifically the prices of labor and land. Formally, this term is negative because we 
have assumed that 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ > 0, while the magnitudes depend on the elasticity of the 
supply of labor and land. Intuitively, an increase in 𝑁𝑁 is an increase in the level of economic activity in 
the county and therefore an increase in the local demand for labor and land. 
Unlike the beneficial effect of agglomeration spillovers, the increase in factor prices is costly for 
incumbent firms, because they now have to compete for locally scare resources with the new entrant. The 
increase in wages and land prices has two effects on incumbents.  First, for a  given level of input 
utilization, it mechanically raises production costs. Second, it leads the firm to re-optimize and to change 
its use of the different production inputs. In particular, given that the price of capital is not affected by an 
increase in 𝑁𝑁, the firm is likely to end up using more capital than before: 𝜕𝜕𝐾𝐾∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ ≥ 0. 
By contrast, the effect on the use of labor and land is ambiguous. On one hand, the productivity 
of all factors increases. On the other hand, the price of labor and land increases. The net effect depends on 
the magnitude of the factor price increases, as well as on the exact shape of the production function (i.e., 
the strength of technological complementarities between labor, capital, and land). 
It is instructive to apply these derivations to the case of a MDP opening that causes positive 
spillovers. We initially consider the case where for incumbent firms 𝑑𝑑𝗱𝗱∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁 ⁄ ≤ 0. This would occur 
when the agglomeration spillover is smaller than the increase in production costs. In this case, the MDP’s 10 
 
opening would not lead to entry and could cause some existing firms to exit.
12
The alternative case is that 𝑑𝑑𝗱𝗱∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁 ⁄ > 0, which occurs when the magnitude of the spillover due 
to the MDP opening exceeds the increase in factor prices due to the MDP’s demand for local inputs. In 
the short run, profits will be positive for new entrants. These positive profits will disappear over time as 
the price of local factors, like land and possibly labor, is bid up.  
 
In the long run, there is an equilibrium such that firms and workers are indifferent between the 
county where the new plant has opened and other locales. Since the amount of land is fixed, the higher 
levels of productivity are likely to be capitalized into land prices. It is also likely that wages will increase. 
This may occur due to moving costs as noted above.
13
There are two empirical predictions that apply when there are positive spillovers. First, if the 
magnitude of the spillovers is large enough, new firms will enter the MDP’s county to gain access to the 
spillover. This prediction of increased economic activity holds at any point after potential new entrants 
have had sufficient time to respond. The second prediction is that the prices of locally traded inputs will 
rise as the MDP and the new entrants bid for these inputs.
  These adjustments make workers indifferent 
between the county with the new plant and other counties. Similarly, the changes in factor prices mean 
that firms earn the same profits in the county with the new plant (even in the presence of the spillovers) 
and in other locations. From a practical perspective, it is not possible in our empirical context to know 
when the short run ends and the long run begins.  
14
(ii) Heterogeneous Incumbents.  What happens if the population of incumbent firms is non-
homogeneous? Consider the case where there are two types of firms: high-tech and low-tech. Assume that 
 
                                                 
12 Similarly, if the spillovers are zero or negative, one might expect exit of incumbent firms and a reduction in local 
economic activity.  
13 Even with zero moving costs and an infinitely elastic supply of labor, wages will increase if there are land price 
increases as workers will demand higher wages as compensation for the higher land rents for their homes (Roback 
1982).  
14 This paper focuses on the case where the productivity benefits of the agglomeration spillovers are distributed 
equally across all factors. What happens when agglomeration spillovers are factor biased? Assume, for example, that 
agglomeration spillovers raise the productivity of labor, but not the productivity of capital. As before, the technology 
is 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴,𝐿𝐿,𝐾𝐾,𝑇𝑇), but now 𝐿𝐿 represents units of effective labor. In particular, 𝐿𝐿 = 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 , where 𝜃𝜃 is the number of 
physical workers and 𝜃𝜃 is a productivity shifter. We define factor-biased agglomeration spillover as the case where 
the productivity shifter 𝜃𝜃 depends positively on the density of the economic activity in the county 𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃(𝑁𝑁) and 
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ > 0. If 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ = 0 and factors are paid their marginal product, then the effect of an increase in the density 
of the economic activity in a county on incumbent firms simplifies to 𝑑𝑑𝗱𝗱∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁 = ⁄ (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 ⁄ × 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ )𝜃𝜃 −
[𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ 𝜃𝜃∗ + 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ 𝑇𝑇∗]. The effect on profits can be decomposed in two parts. The first term represents the 
increased productivity of labor. It is the product of the sensitivity of output to labor (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 ⁄ > 0), times the 
magnitude of the agglomeration spillover (𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ > 0 by definition), times the number of workers. The second 
term is the same as in equation (3), and represents the increase in the costs of locally supplied inputs. The increase in 
𝑁𝑁  changes the optimal use of the production inputs.  Labor is now more productive, and its equilibrium use 
increases:  𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ ≤ 0.  Land is equally productive but its price increases, so its equilibrium use declines: 
𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁 ⁄ ≤ 0. Neither the price nor the productivity of capital is affected by an increase in 𝑁𝑁. Its equilibrium use 
depends on technology; specifically, it depends on the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. 11 
 
for technological reasons, the type of workers employed by high-tech firms, 𝐿𝐿𝜃𝜃, differs to some extent 
from the type of workers employed by low-tech firms, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, although there is some overlap. Assume that 
the new entrant is a high-tech firm. Equations (4) and (5) characterize the effect of the new high-tech firm 
on high-tech and low-tech incumbents: 
(4)    𝑑𝑑𝗱𝗱𝜃𝜃
∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ = (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝜃𝜃 ⁄ × 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ ) − [𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ 𝐿𝐿𝜃𝜃
∗ + 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ 𝑇𝑇∗] 
(5)    𝑑𝑑𝗱𝗱𝐿𝐿
∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ = (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 ⁄ × 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ ) − [𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
∗ + 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ 𝑇𝑇∗]. 
It is plausible to expect that the beneficial effect of agglomeration spillovers generated by a new high-
tech entrant is larger for high-tech firms than for low-tech firms:  
(5')     (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝜃𝜃 ⁄ × 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ ) > (𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 ⁄ × 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ ). 
At the same time, one might expect that the increase in labor costs is also higher for the high-tech 
incumbents, given that they are now competing for workers with an additional high-tech firm: 
(5'')     𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ > 𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜃𝜃 ⁄ . 
The effect on land prices should be similar for both firm types, since the assumption of a single land 
market seems reasonable. 
This model of heterogeneous incumbents has two main implications. First, it may be reasonable to 
expect larger spillovers on firms that are economically “closer” to the new plant. Second the relative 
impact of the new plant on profits is unclear, because the economically “closer” plants are likely to have 
both larger spillovers and larger increases in production costs. 
 
C. Empirical Predictions 
The simple theoretical framework above generates four predictions that we bring to the data. 
Specifically if there are positive spillovers, then: 
1.  the opening of a new plant will increase TFP of incumbent plants.  
2.  the increase in TFP may be larger for firms that are economically “closer” to the new plant.  
3.  the density of economic activity in the county will increase as firms move in to gain access to the 
positive spillovers (if the spillovers are large enough).  
4.  the price of locally supplied factors of production will increase. We test for changes in the price of 
quality-adjusted labor, which is arguably the most important local factor for manufacturing plants. 
 
II. Plant Location Decisions and Research Design 
  In testing the four empirical predictions outlined above, the main econometric challenge is that 
firms do not choose their location randomly. Firms maximize profits and choose to locate where their 
expectation of the present discounted value of future profits is greatest. This net present value varies 
tremendously across locations depending on many factors, including: transportation infrastructure, the 12 
 
availability of workers with particular skills, subsidies, etc. These factors are frequently unobserved and, 
problematically, they are likely to be correlated with the TFP of existing plants.  
Therefore, a naïve comparison of the TFP of incumbents in counties that experience a plant 
opening with the TFP of incumbents in counties that do not experience a plant opening is likely to yield 
biased estimates of productivity spillovers. Credible estimates of the impact of a plant opening on TFP of 
incumbent plants require the identification of a location that is similar to the location where the plant 
decided to locate in the determinants of incumbent plants’ TFP. 
This section provides a case study for how BMW picked the location for one of its plants.
15
After overseeing a worldwide competition and considering 250 potential sites for its new plant, 
BMW announced in 1991 that they had narrowed the list of potential candidates to 20 US counties. Six 
months later, BMW announced that the two finalists in the competition were Greenville-Spartanburg, 
South Carolina, and Omaha, Nebraska.  In 1992, BMW announced that they would site the plant in 
Greenville-Spartanburg and that they would receive a package of incentives worth approximately $115 
million funded by the state and local governments. 
 The 
intent is to demonstrate the empirical difficulties that arise when estimating the effect of plant openings 
on the TFP of incumbent plants. Further, it illustrates informally how our research design may circumvent 
these difficulties.  
Why did BMW choose Greenville-Spartanburg? Two factors were important in this decision. The 
first was BMW’s expected future costs of production in Greenville-Spartanburg, which are presumably a 
function of the county’s expected supply of inputs and BMW’s production technology. According to 
BMW, the characteristics that made Greenville-Spartanburg more attractive than the other 250 sites 
initially considered were: low union density;  a supply of qualified workers;  numerous global firms, 
including 58 German companies, in the area; high quality transportation infrastructure, including air, rail, 
highway, and port access; and access to key local services. 
For our purposes, the important point to note here is that these county characteristics are a 
potential source of unobserved heterogeneity. While these characteristics are well documented in the 
BMW case, they are generally unknown and unobserved. If these characteristics also affect the growth of 
TFP of existing plants, a standard regression that compares Greenville-Spartanburg with the other 3,000 
United States counties will yield biased estimates of the effect of the plant opening. A standard regression 
will overestimate the effect of plant openings on outcomes if, for example, counties that have more 
attractive characteristics (e.g., improving transportation infrastructure) tend to have faster TFP growth. 
Conversely, a standard regression would underestimate the effect if, for example, incumbent plants’ 
                                                 
15 This plant is in Greenstone and Moretti’s (2004) set of 82 MDP plants. Due to Census confidentiality restrictions, 
we cannot report whether this plant is part of this paper’s analysis. 13 
 
declining TFP encourages new entrants (e.g., cheaper availability of local inputs). 
A  second  important  factor  in BMW’s  decision was the value of the subsidy it received. 
Presumably Greenville-Spartanburg was willing to provide BMW with $115 million in subsidies because 
it expected economic benefits from BMW's presence. According to local officials, the facility’s ex-ante 
expected five-year economic impact on the region was $2 billion. As a part of this $2 billion, the plant 
was expected to create 2,000 jobs directly and another 2,000 jobs indirectly. In principle, these 2,000 
additional jobs could reflect the entry of new plants or the expansion of existing plants caused by 
agglomeration  economies.  Thus, the subsidy  is likely to  be  a function of  the expected  gains from 
agglomeration for the county.
16
This possibility is relevant for this paper’s identification strategy, because the magnitude of the 
spillover from a particular plant depends on the level and growth of a county’s industrial structure, labor 
force, and a series of other unobserved variables. For this reason, the factors that determine the total size 
of the potential spillover (and presumably the size of the subsidy) represent a second potential source of 
unobserved heterogeneity. If this unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with incumbent plants’ TFP, 
standard regression equations will be misspecified due to omitted variables, just as described above.  
  
In order to make valid inferences in the presence of the heterogeneity associated with the plant’s 
expected local production costs and the county’s value of attracting the plant, knowledge of the exact 
form of the selection rule that determines plants’ location decisions is generally necessary. As the BMW 
example demonstrates, the two factors that determine plant location decisions are generally unknown to 
researchers and, in the rare cases where they are known, are difficult to measure. Thus, the effect of a 
plant opening on incumbents’ TFP is very likely to be confounded by differences in factors that determine 
the plants’ profitability at the chosen location.  
  As a solution to this identification problem, we rely on the reported location rankings of profit-
maximizing firms to identify a valid counterfactual for what would have happened to incumbent plants in 
winning counties in the absence of the plant opening. We implement the research design using data from 
the corporate real estate journal Site Selection. Each issue of this journal includes an article titled the 
“Million Dollar Plants” that describes how a large plant decided where to locate. These articles always 
report the county that the plant chose (i.e., the "winner"), and usually report the runner-up county or 
counties (i.e., the "losers").
17
                                                 
16 The fact that business organizations such as the Chambers of Commerce support these incentive plans (as was the 
case with BMW) suggests that incumbent firms expect such increases. Greenstone and Moretti (2004) present a 
model that describes the factors that determine local governments’ bids for these plants and whether successfully 
attracting a plant will be welfare-increasing or welfare-decreasing for the county.   
 As the BMW case study indicates, the winner and losers are usually chosen 
17 In some instances the “Million Dollar Plants” articles do not identify the runner-up county. For these cases, we did 
a Lexis/Nexis search for other articles discussing the plant opening and in 4 cases, among the original 82, we were 14 
 
from an initial sample of "semi-finalist" sites that in many cases number more than a hundred.
18
We use the losers to identify what would have happened to the productivity of incumbent plants 
in the winning county in the absence of the plant opening. Specifically, we assume that incumbent firms’ 
TFP would have trended identically in the absence of the plant opening in winning and losing counties 
within a case.  In practice, we adjust for covariates so our  identifying assumption is weaker.  The 
subsequent analysis provides  evidence that supports the validity of this assumption.  Even  if this 
assumption fails to hold, we presume that this pairwise approach is more reliable than using regression 
adjustment to compare the TFP of incumbent plants in counties with new plants to the other 3,000 United 
States counties or to using a matching procedure based on observable variables.
 The 
losers are counties that have survived a long selection process, but narrowly lost the competition.  
19
 
 
 
III. Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
A.   Data Sources 
The “Million Dollar Plants” articles typically reveal the county where the new firm (the “Million 
Dollar Plant”) ultimately chose to locate (the “winning county”) and one or two runner-up counties (the 
“losing counties”). The articles tend to focus on large manufacturing plants that are the target of local 
government subsidies. An important limitation of these articles is that the magnitude of subsidy offered 
by winning counties is often unobserved and the subsidy offered by losing counties is almost always 
unobserved. In addition, when there is more than one losing county, there is no indication of the plants' 
relative preferences among the losing counties.  
We identify  the Million Dollar Plants in the Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL), 
which is the Census Bureau’s “most complete, current, and consistent data for U.S. business 
establishment”
20 – and matched the plants to the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) and the Census 
of Manufactures (CM) from 1973-1998.
21
                                                                                                                                                             
able to identify the losing counties. Comprehensive data on the subsidy offered by winning and losing counties is 
unavailable in the Site Selection articles. 
 Of the 82 MDP openings in Greenstone and Moretti (2004), we 
identified 47 genuine and useable MDP openings in the manufacturing data. In order to qualify as a 
18 The names of the semi-finalists are rarely reported. 
19 Propensity score matching is an alternative approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Its principal shortcoming 
relative to our approach is its assumption that the treatment (i.e., winner status) is “ignorable” conditional on the 
observables. As it should be clear from the example, adjustment for observable variables through the propensity 
score is unlikely to be sufficient. 
20 The SSEL is confidential and was accessed in a Census Data Research Center. The SSEL is updated continuously 
and incorporates data from all Census Bureau economic and agriculture censuses and current business surveys, 
quarterly and annual Federal income and payroll tax records, and other Departmental and Federal statistics and 
administrative records programs. 
21 The sample is cut at 1998 because sampling methods in the ASM changed for 1999. The sample begins in 1973 
because of minor known inconsistencies with the 1972 CM. 15 
 
genuine and useable MDP manufacturing opening, we imposed the following criterion: 1) there had to be 
a new plant in the manufacturing sector, owned by the reported firm, appearing in the SSEL within 2 
years before and 3 years after the publication of the MDP article; 2) the plant identified in the SSEL had 
to be located in the county indicated in the MDP article; and 3) there had to be incumbent plants in both 
winning and losing counties present for each of the previous 8 years. Among the 35 MDP openings that 
did not qualify, we identified 10 openings in the retail and wholesale trade sectors whose effects we 
examine in robustness specifications. 
  To obtain information on incumbent establishments in winner and loser counties, we use the ASM 
and CM. The ASM and CM contain information on employment, capital stocks, materials, total value of 
shipments, and firm identifiers. The 4-digit SIC code and county of location are also reported and these 
play a key role in the analysis. Importantly, the manufacturing data contain a unique plant identifier, 
making it possible to follow individual plants over time.
22
There are a few noteworthy features of this sample of potentially affected plants. First, the focus 
on existing plants allows for a test of spillovers on a fixed sample of pre-existing plants, which eliminates 
concerns related to the endogenous opening of new plants and compositional bias. Second, it is possible 
to form a genuine panel of manufacturing plants. Third, a disadvantage is that the results may not be 
externally valid to smaller incumbent plants that are not sampled with certainty throughout this period. 
Nevertheless, it is relevant that this sample of plants accounts for 54% of county-wide manufacturing 
shipments in the last CM before the MDP opening. 
 Our main analysis uses a sample of plants that 
were continuously present in the ASM in the 8 years preceding the year of the plant opening plus the year 
of the opening. Additionally, we drop all plants owned by firms that own a MDP. In this period, the ASM 
sampling scheme was positively related to firm and plant size. Any establishment that was part of a 
company with manufacturing shipments exceeding $500 million was sampled with certainty, as were 
establishments with 250 or more employees.  
  In addition to testing for an average  spillover effect, we also test whether the estimated 
agglomeration effects are larger in industries that are more closely linked to the MDP based on some 
measure of economic distance. We focus on six measures of economic distance in three categories. First, 
to measure supplier and customer linkages, we use data on the fraction of each industry’s manufactured 
inputs that come from each 3-digit industry and the fraction of each industry’s outputs sold to 
manufacturers that are purchased by each 3-digit industry. Second, to measure the frequency of worker 
mobility between industries, we use data on labor market transitions from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) outgoing rotation file. In particular, we measure the fraction of separating workers from each 2-
digit industry that move to firms in each 2-digit industry. Third, to measure technological proximity, we 
                                                 
22 See the appendix in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) for a more thorough description of the ASM and CM. 16 
 
use data on the fraction of patents manufactured in a 3-digit industry that cite patents manufactured in 
each 3-digit industry. We also use data on the amount of R&D expenditure in a 3-digit industry that is 
used in other 3-digit industries. 
  Finally, one further data issue merits attention. We have two sources of information on the date of 
the plant opening. The first is the MDP articles, which often are written when ground is broken on the 
plant but other times are written when the location decision is made or when the plant begins operations. 
The second source is the SSEL, which in principle reports the plant’s first year of operation. However, it 
is known that plants occasionally enter the SSEL after their opening.  
Thus, there is uncertainty about the date of the plant’s opening. Further, the date at which the 
plant could affect the operations of existing plants depends on the channel for agglomeration spillovers. If 
the agglomeration spillovers are a consequence of supplier relationships, then they could occur as soon as 
the plant is announced. For example, the new plant’s management might visit existing plants and provide 
suggestions on operations. Alternatively, the agglomeration spillovers may be driven by the labor market 
and therefore may depend on sharing labor. In this case, agglomeration spillovers may not be evident until 
the plant is operating. Based on these data and conceptual issues, there is not clear guidance on when the 
new plant could affect other plants. To be conservative and allow for each possibility, we emphasize 
results using the earliest of (1) the publication year of the magazine article and (2) the year that the 
matched MDP appears in the SSEL. 
 
B.   Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the sample of plant location decisions that forms the basis 
of the analysis. As discussed in the previous subsection, there are 47 manufacturing MDP openings that 
we can match to plant level data. There are plants in the same 2-digit SIC industry in both winning and 
losing counties in the 8 years preceding the opening for just 16 of these openings.  
The table reveals some other facts about the plant openings.
23
                                                 
23 A number of the statistics in Table 1 are reported in broad categories to comply with the Census Bureau’s 
confidentiality restrictions and to avoid disclosing the identities of any individual plants. 
  We refer to the winner and 
accompanying loser(s) associated with each plant opening as a “case.” There are two or more losers in 16 
of the cases, so there are a total of 73 losing counties along with 47 winning counties. Some counties 
appear multiple times in the sample (as either a winner or loser), and the average county in the sample 
appears a total of 1.09 times. The difference between the year of the MDP article publication and the year 
the plant appears in the SSEL is roughly spread evenly across the categories -2 to -1 years, 0 years, and 1 
to 3 years. For clarity, positive differences refer to cases where the article appears after the plant is 
identified in the SSEL. The date of the plant openings ranges from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. 17 
 
The remainder of Table 1 provides summary statistics on the MDPs,  five years after their 
assigned opening date. These MDPs are quite large: they are more than twice the size of the average 
incumbent plant and account for roughly nine percent of the average county’s total output one year prior 
to their opening. 
  Table 2 provides summary statistics on the measures of industry linkages and further descriptions 
of these variables. In all cases, the proximity between industries is increasing in the value of the variable. 
For ease of interpretation in the subsequent regressions, these variables are normalized to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one. 
Table 3 presents the means of county-level and plant-level variables across counties. These means 
are reported for winners, losers, and the entire United States in columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
24
This exercise provides an opportunity to assess the validity of the research design, as measured by 
pre-existing observable county and plant characteristics.  To the extent that these observable 
characteristics are balanced among winning and losing counties, this should lend credibility to the 
analysis.  The comparison between winner counties and the rest of the United States provides an 
opportunity to assess the validity of the type of analysis that would be undertaken in the absence of a 
quasi-experiment. 
 In 
the winner and loser columns, the plant-level variables are calculated among the incumbent plants present 
in the ASM in the 8 years preceding the assigned opening date and the assigned opening date. All entries 
in the entire United States column are weighted across years to produce statistics for the year of the 
average MDP opening in our sample. Further, the plant characteristics are only calculated among plants 
that appear in the ASM for at least 9 consecutive years. Column (4) presents the t-statistics from a test that 
the entries in (1) and (2) are equal, while Column (5) repeats this for a test of equality between columns 
(1) and (3). Columns (6) through (10) repeat this exercise among the cases where there are plants within 
the same 2-digit SIC industry as the MDP. In these columns, the plant characteristics are calculated 
among the plants in the same 2-digit industry.  
The top panel reports county-level characteristics measured in the year before the assigned plant 
opening and the percentage change between 7 years and 1 year before the opening. Compared to the rest 
of the country, winning counties have higher incomes, population and population growth, labor force 
participation rates and growth, and a higher share of labor in manufacturing. Among the 8 variables in 
this panel, 6 of the 8 differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. These differences are 
substantially mitigated when the winners are compared to losers: 3 of the 8 variables are statistically 
                                                 
24 The losing county entries in column (2) are weighted in the following manner. Losing counties are weighted by 
the inverse of their number in that case. Losing plants are weighted by the inverse of their number per-county, 
multiplied by the inverse of the number of losing counties in their case. The result is that each county (and each 
plant within each county) is given equal weight within the case and then all cases are given equal weight. 18 
 
different at the 5% level, and none are at the 1% level. Notably, the raw differences between winners and 
losers within the subset of cases where there are plants in the same 2-digit SIC industry are generally 
smaller, and none are statistically significant. 
The second panel reports on the number of sample plants and provides information on some of 
their characteristics. In light of our sample selection criteria, the number of plants is of special interest. On 
average, there are 18.8 plants in the winner counties and 25.6 in the loser counties (and just 8.0 in the 
average US county). The covariates are well-balanced between plants in winning and losing counties; in 
fact, there are no statistically significant differences either among all plants or among plants within the 
same 2-digit industry.
25
Overall, Table 3 shows that the MDP winner-loser research design balances many (although not 
all) observable county-level and plant-level covariates. Of course, this exercise does not guarantee that 
unobserved variables are balanced across winner and loser counties or their plants. In the subsequent 
analysis, we find  that trends in TFP were similar in winning and losing counties prior to the MDP 
opening, which lends further credibility to this design. The next section outlines our full econometric 
model and highlights the exact assumptions necessary for consistent estimation.  
 
   
 
IV. Econometric Model 
Building on the model in section I, we start by assuming that incumbent plants use the following 
Cobb-Douglas technology: 
(6)         𝑌𝑌 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝗽𝗽1 𝐾𝐾𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐵𝐵 𝗽𝗽2𝐾𝐾𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐸𝐸 𝗽𝗽3𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝗽𝗽4  
where 𝑝𝑝 references plant, 𝑝𝑝 industry, 𝑝𝑝 case, and 𝑝𝑝 year; 𝑌𝑌 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  is the total value of shipments minus changes 
in inventories; 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  is TFP; and we allow total labor hours of production 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 , building capital stock 
𝐾𝐾𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐵𝐵  , machinery and equipment capital stock 𝐾𝐾𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐸𝐸  , and the dollar value of materials 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  to have 
separate impacts on output. In practice, the two capital stock variables are calculated with the permanent 
inventory method that uses earlier years of data on book values and deflated values of subsequent 
investment.
26
                                                 
25 Roughly 20% of the winners were in the Rust Belt, compared to roughly 25% of the losers (where the Rust Belt is 
defined as MI, IN, OH, PA, NJ, IL, WI, NY). Roughly 65% of the winners were in the South, compared to roughly 
45% of the losers. 
 
26 For the first date available, plants’ historical capital stock book values are deflated to constant dollars using BEA 
data by 2-digit industry. In all periods, plants’ investment is deflated to the same constant dollars using Federal 
Reserve data by 3-digit industry. Changes in the capital stock are constructed by depreciating the initial deflated 
capital stock using Federal Reserve depreciation rates and adding deflated investment. In each year, productive 
capital stock is defined as the average over the beginning and ending values, plus the deflated level of capital rentals. 
The analysis is performed separately for building capital and machinery capital. This procedure is described further 
by Becker et al. (2005), Chiang (2004), and Davis et al. (1996), from whose files we gratefully obtained deflators. 19 
 
Recall that equation (1) in Section I allows for agglomeration spillovers by assuming that TFP is 
a function of the number of firms that are active in a county: 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝐴𝐴(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ). Here we also allow for 
some additional heterogeneity in 𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 .  In particular, we generalize equation (1) by allowing for 
permanent differences in TFP across plants 𝗼𝗼𝑝𝑝, cases 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝, industry-specific time-varying shocks to TFP 
𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, and a stochastic error term 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 : 
     ln�𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � = 𝗼𝗼𝑝𝑝 + 𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝐴𝐴(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ). 
The goal is to estimate the causal effect of winning a plant on incumbent plants’ TFP. To do so, 
we need to impose some structure on 𝐴𝐴(𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ). In particular, we use a specification that allows for the 
new plant in winning counties to affect both the level of TFP as well as its growth over time: 
(7)     ln�𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � =𝗿𝗿1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜓𝜓𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝗺𝗺(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑 × 1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝                              
+ 𝜅𝜅1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝗾𝗾(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑 × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝                               
+ 𝜃𝜃1(1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟) × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜃𝜃2(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑 × 1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟) × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝                 
+ 𝗼𝗼𝑝𝑝 + 𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
where 1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  is a dummy equal to 1 if plant 𝑝𝑝 is located in a winner county; and 𝜏𝜏 denotes year, 
but it is normalized so that for each case the assigned year of the plant opening is 𝜏𝜏 = 0. The variable 
𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 is a simple time trend. 
Combining equations (6) and (7) and taking logs, we obtain the regression equation that forms the 
basis of our empirical analysis: 
(8)     ln�𝑌𝑌 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � =𝗽𝗽1 ln�𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � + 𝗽𝗽2 ln�𝐾𝐾𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐵𝐵  � + 𝗽𝗽3 ln�𝐾𝐾𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐸𝐸  � + 𝗽𝗽4 ln�𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 �                     
+ 𝗿𝗿1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜓𝜓𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝗺𝗺(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑 × 1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝                            
+ 𝜅𝜅1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝗾𝗾(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑 × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝                                 
+ 𝜃𝜃1(1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟) × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜃𝜃2(𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑 × 1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟) × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝                 
+ 𝗼𝗼𝑝𝑝 + 𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
 
 
Equation (8) is an augmented Cobb-Douglass production function that allows labor, building capital, 
machinery capital, and materials to have differential impacts on output.  The paper’s focus is the 
estimation of the spillover effects of the new plant on incumbent plants’ TFP, so the parameters of interest 
are θ1 and θ2. The former tests for a mean shift in TFP among incumbent plants in the winning county 
after the opening of the MDP, while the latter tests for a trend break in TFP among the same plants.  
In practice, we estimate two variants of Equation (8). In some specifications, we fit a more 
parsimonious model that simply tests for a mean shift. In this model, any productivity effect is assumed to 
occur immediately and to remain constant over time. Specifically, we make the restrictions that 𝜓𝜓 = 𝗺𝗺 =
𝗾𝗾 = 𝜃𝜃2 = 0, which rules out differential trends. This specification is essentially a difference-in-difference 
estimator and we refer to it as Model 1. Formally, after adjustment for the inputs, 1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 , and 20 
 
1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, the consistency of 𝜃𝜃1  in this model requires the assumption that 𝐸𝐸�(1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟) ×
1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 |𝗼𝗼𝑝𝑝,𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝,𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝] = 0. 
In other specifications, we estimate the entire Equation (8) without imposing such restrictions on 
the trends, and label this Model 2. This specification allows for both a mean shift and trend break in 
productivity (as in Glaeser and Mare, 2001). In theory, Model 2 allows us to investigate whether any 
productivity effect occurs immediately and whether the impact evolves over time.  In practice, 
disentangling these effects is demanding of the data because our sample is only balanced through 𝜏𝜏 = 5 
and there are only 6 years per case to estimate 𝜃𝜃1 and 𝜃𝜃2. The other main practical difference between 
Model 1 and Model 2 is that the latter allows for differential pre-trends in incumbent plants' TFP. 
The other terms in Equation (8) control for unobserved determinants of TFP that might otherwise 
be confounded with the spillover effects of the MDP opening. These terms control for TFP differences in 
winning counties (𝗿𝗿), a time trend in winning and losing counties (𝜓𝜓), a change in winning and losing 
counties after the MDP opening (𝜅𝜅), a trend break in winning and losing counties after the MDP opening 
(𝗾𝗾), and a differential time trend in winning counties prior to the MDP opening (𝗺𝗺). This differential pre-
trend in winning counties (𝗺𝗺) will serve as an important way to assess the validity of this research design. 
The specification also includes three sets of fixed effects: plant fixed effects (𝗼𝗼𝑝𝑝), so the comparisons are 
within a plant;  2-digit SIC industry by year fixed effects (𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)  to account for industry-specific TFP 
shocks; and separate fixed effects for each case (𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝) to ensure that the impact of the MDP opening is 
identified from comparisons within a winner-loser pair. These case fixed effects recreate in a regression 
framework the intuitive appeal of pairwise differencing within cases, and averaging this effect across all 
cases.  
A few further estimation details bear noting. First, unobserved demand shocks are likely to affect 
input utilization, and this raises the possibility that the estimated β’s are inconsistent (see, e.g., Griliches 
and Mairesse 1995). This has been a topic of considerable research and we are unaware of a complete 
solution. In a variety of robustness specifications, we implement the standard fixes including: modeling 
the inputs with alternative functional forms (e.g., the translog); fixing the β’s equal to their cost shares at 
the plant and industry-level; controlling for flexible functions of investment, capital, materials, and labor; 
and instrumenting for current inputs with lagged changes in inputs (Syverson 2004a and 2004b; van 
Biesebroeck 2004; Olley and Pakes 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin 2003; Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 
2006; Blundell and Bond 1998). Additionally, we experiment with adding fixed effects for region-by-year 
or region-by-industry-by-year, and allowing the effect of inputs to differ by industry or by winner and 
post-MDP status. The basic results are unchanged by these alterations in the specification. We also note 
that unobserved demand shocks are only a concern for the consistent estimation of our main parameters of 21 
 
interest (θ1 and θ2) if they systematically affect incumbent plants in winning counties in the years after the 
MDP opening, after adjustment for the rich set of covariates in equation (8).  
Second, in some cases this equation is estimated on a sample of plants from the entire country, 
but in most specifications the sample is limited to plants from winning and losing counties in the ASM for 
every year from τ = -8 through τ = 0.
27 This smaller sample of plants from only winning and losing 
counties allows for the impact of the inputs and the industry shocks to differ in these counties from the 
rest of the country. For most of the analysis, we further restrict the sample to observations in the years 
between 𝜏𝜏 = −7 and 𝜏𝜏 = 5. Due to the dates of the MDP openings, this is the longest period for which 
we have data from all cases.
28
Third, we probe the validity and robustness of our estimates with a number of supplementary 
specifications. For example, we investigate how the estimates may be influenced by unobserved changes 
in plant inputs, attrition of sample plants, mismeasurement of TFP, and changes in prices of incumbents' 
output. A complementary analysis of plants' factor input demand provides corroborating evidence for TFP 
increases, without many of the biases associated with estimating plant-level TFP. 
 
Fourth,  all of the reported standard errors are clustered at the county level to account for the 
correlation in outcomes among plants in the same county, both within periods and over time.  
Fifth, we focus on weighted versions of equation (8). Specifically, the specifications are weighted by 
the square root of the total value of shipments in 𝜏𝜏 = −8 to account for heteroskedasticity associated with 
differences in plant size. This weighting also means that the results measure the change in productivity for 
the average dollar of output, which in our view is more meaningful than the impact of the MDP on the 
average plant. 
The analysis will also explore two additional issues. It will report on the fitting of versions of 
equation (8) that interact the spillover variables with measures of economic distance between the MDP 
and the incumbent plant. These specifications assess whether the magnitude of the estimated spillovers 
varies with economic distance. Finally, the paper will assess whether the MDP opening affects local skill-
adjusted wages and the entry and exit decisions of plants in the MDP’s county.
29
 
 
V. Results 
  This section is divided into three subsections. The first reports baseline estimates of the effect of 
                                                 
27 When data from the entire country is used, the sample is limited to plants that are in the ASM for at least 14 
consecutive years. 
28 Data from all cases is also available for τ = -8, but shipments in this period are used to weight the regressions. 
29 We hired a graduate student at Princeton to review publicly disclosed and annotated versions of all STATA 
programs.  This person was not associated with the authors or their institutions prior to serving as the program 
proofreader.  To the best of his knowledge, the computer codes were correct.  The authors remain fully responsible 
for any coding errors in the analysis. 22 
 
the opening of a new "Million Dollar Plant" on the productivity of incumbent plants in the same county 
through the estimation of equation  (8).  The  second  subsection explores potential channels for the 
agglomeration effects by testing whether the estimated spillovers vary as a function of economic distance. 
The third subsection explores the implications of the estimates for the profits of local firms. 
 
A.   Baseline Estimates 
  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report estimated parameters and their standard errors from a 
version of equation (8). Specifically, the natural log of output is regressed on the natural log of inputs, 
year by 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects, plant fixed effects, case fixed effects, and the event time 
indicators in a sample that is restricted to the years 𝜏𝜏 = −7 through 𝜏𝜏 = 5. The reported coefficients on 
the event time indicators reflect yearly mean TFP in winning counties (column 1) and losing counties 
(column 2), relative to the year before the MDP opened. Column (3) reports the yearly difference between 
estimated mean TFP in winning and losing counties. 
Figure 1 graphs the estimated coefficients from Table 4. The top panel separately plots mean TFP 
in winning and losing counties (columns 1 and 2 of Table 4). The bottom panel plots the differences in 
the estimated winner and loser coefficients (column 3 of Table 4). 
The Figure has three important features. First, in the years before the MDP opening, TFP trends 
among incumbent plants were very similar in winning and losing counties. Indeed, a statistical test fails to 
reject that the trends were equal. This finding supports the validity of our identifying assumption that 
incumbent plants in losing counties provide a valid counterfactual for incumbents in winning counties.  
Second,  beginning in the year of the MDP opening, there is a sharp upward break in the 
difference in TFP between the winning and losing counties.  The top panel shows  that this relative 
improvement is mainly due to the continued TFP decline in losing counties and a flattening of the TFP 
trend in winning counties. This underscores the importance of the availability of losing counties as a 
counterfactual. For example, a naïve comparison of TFP in winning counties before and after the MDP 
opening would suggest that it had a negligible impact on incumbents’ TFP. Overall, these graphs reveal 
much of the paper’s primary finding. This relative increase in TFP among incumbent plants in winning 
counties is confirmed throughout a variety of tests in the remainder of the paper. Third, TFP displays a 
negative trend. We discuss in detail this feature in Section VI.  
  Turning to the statistical models, the first four columns of Table 5 present results from fitting 
different versions of equation (8). For Model 1, Panel A reports the estimated mean shift parameter, θ1, 
and  its standard error (in parentheses) in the “Mean Shift” row.  For Model 2, Panel B reports the 
estimated change in TFP evaluated at τ = 5 in the “Effect after 5 years” row, which is determined by the 23 
 
reported  θ1  ("Level Change" row) and  θ2  ("Trend Break" row).
30
  In columns (1) and (2), the sample includes all manufacturing plants in the ASM that report data 
for at least 14 consecutive years, excluding all plants owned by the MDP firm. In column (3), the sample 
is restricted to include only plants in counties that won or lost a MDP. This restriction means that the 
input parameters and the industry-year fixed effects are estimated solely from plants in these counties. 
Incumbent plants are now required to be in the data only for -8 ≤ τ ≤ 0 (not also for 14 consecutive years, 
though this does not change the results). Finally, in column (4), the sample is restricted further to include 
only plant-year observations within the period of interest (where τ ranges from -7 through 5). This forces 
the input parameters and industry-year fixed effects to be estimated solely on plant by year observations 
that identify the spillover parameters. This sample is used throughout the remainder of the paper. Further 
estimation details are noted at the bottom of the table and apply to both Models 1 and 2.  
  The “Pre-Trend”  row  contains the 
coefficient measuring the difference in pre-existing trends between plants in winning and losing counties. 
In all specifications, the estimated change after the MDP opening is determined during the period where τ 
ranges from -7 through 5, as the sample is balanced during these years. 
  The entries in Table 5 confirm the visual impression from Figure 1 that the MDP opening is 
associated with a substantial relative  increase in TFP among incumbent plants in winning counties. 
Specifically, Model 1 implies an increase in TFP of roughly 4.8%. As the figure highlighted, however, the 
impact on TFP appears to be increasing over time so Model 2 seems more appropriate. Results from 
Model 2 suggest that the MDP opening is associated with an approximately 12% increase in TFP five 
years later. Estimates from both models are statistically different from zero by conventional criteria, and 
are unaffected by the specification changes. Furthermore, entries in the “Pre-trend” row demonstrate that 
the null hypothesis of equal trends in TFP among incumbents in winning and losing counties cannot be 
rejected.  
In Column 4, the numbers in square brackets evaluate the average magnitude of TFP change in 
millions of 2006 dollars. These numbers are calculated by multiplying the estimated percent change by 
the mean value of incumbent plants’ total shipments in winning counties in τ = -1. For Model 1, this 
calculation indicates that the increase in TFP following a MDP opening was associated with an annual 
increase in total output of $170 million. The Model 2 estimate is even larger, suggesting an increase in 
output of roughly $429 million in year τ = 5. These numbers are large, with the Model 2 effect at τ = 5 
nearly the average level of MDP output. Section VII discusses the interpretation of this change and its 
magnitude. 
Column (5) presents results from a “naïve” estimator that is based on using plant openings 
                                                 
30 This is calculated as θ1 + 6θ2, because we allow the MDP to affect outcomes from τ = 0 through τ = 5.  24 
 
without an explicit counterfactual. To begin, a set of 47 plant openings was randomly chosen from the 
ASM in the same years and industries as the MDP openings. The remainder of the sample includes all 
manufacturing plants in the ASM for 14 consecutive years, and not also owned by firms that own the 
randomly chosen plants. With these data, we fit a regression of the natural log of output on the natural log 
of inputs, year by 2-digit SIC fixed effects, and plant fixed effects. In Model 1, two additional dummy 
variables are included for whether the plant is in a winning county 7 to 1 years before the randomly 
chosen opening or 0 to 5 years after. The reported mean shift is the difference in these two coefficients 
(i.e., the average change in TFP following the opening). In Model 2, the same two dummy variables are 
included along with pre- and post-trend variables. The shift in level and trend are reported, along with the 
pre-trend and the total effect evaluated after 5 years. Finally, this procedure is implemented 1000 times 
and the reported parameters are the mean and standard deviation of those estimates. 
This naïve “first-difference” style estimator indicates that the opening of a new plant is associated 
with a -3% to -5% change in incumbent plants’ TFP, depending on the model. If the estimates from the 
MDP research design are correct, then this naïve approach understates the extent of spillovers by 10% 
(Model 1) to 15% (Model 2). Interestingly, the estimated "pre-trend" indicates that TFP of incumbent 
plants was on a downward trend in advance of the randomly selected new plant openings. This is similar 
to what is observed in our MDP sample of winners. Overall, the absence of a credible research design can 
lead to misleading inferences in this setting. 
It is natural to wonder about the degree of heterogeneity in the treatment effects from the 47 
separate case studies that underlie the estimates presented thus far. Figure 2 explores this heterogeneity by 
plotting case-specific  estimates  of  parameter  θ1  in Model 1  and their 95% confidence interval. 
Specifically, the Figure plots results from a version of Model 1 that interacts the variable (1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟) ×
1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0)) with indicators for each of the cases. This specification yields 45 estimates of θ1, as results 
from two cases were omitted to comply with the Census Bureau’s confidentiality rules. Figure 2 reveals 
that there is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated impacts on TFP of incumbent plants. 27 of the 45 
estimates are positive.  13 of the positive estimates  and 9 of the negative estimates  are  statistically 
different from zero at the 5% level.  We explored whether this heterogeneity is related to the MDP 
characteristics, but the limited number of cases provide insufficient power to detect much with 
confidence. Specifically, we regressed the estimates against three measures of the MDP's size, whether 
the MDP is owned by a foreign company, and whether it is an auto company. When these multiple 
measures were included jointly, none were significantly related to the estimated effect of the MDP's 
opening.
31
                                                 
31 Separate regressions of the case specific effects on the MDP's total output or the MDP's total labor force generated 
statistically significant negative coefficients. This result is consistent with the possibility that when the MDP is very 
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  Ultimately, TFP is a residual and residual labeling must be done cautiously. As an alternative way 
to examine the MDP impact, we estimate directly the changes in incumbent plant output (unadjusted for 
inputs) and inputs following a MDP opening. Contrasting changes in outputs and inputs can shed light on 
whether productivity increased without imposing the structural assumptions of the production function. 
Put another way, are the incumbents producing more with less after the MDP opening? Factor input 
decisions also reflect firms' optimization decisions, and do not share many of the same potential biases as 
changes in technology (e.g., output price effects). 
  Table 6 reports estimated  changes in incumbent plant output and inputs following a MDP 
opening. These estimates are from the Model 1 and Model 2 versions of equation (8), but exclude the 
inputs as covariates. For Model 1, output increases by 12% (Column 1) and inputs increase by 4 to 13% 
(Columns 2 through 5).  For Model 2, output increases by 8% and inputs increase less.  Across all 
specifications, it is striking that the change in all of the inputs is roughly equal to or less than the increase 
in output. Overall, it appears that incumbent plants produced more with less after the MDP opening, 
which is consistent with the TFP increases uncovered in Table 5.
32
 
 Furthermore, there is some evidence 
of increased input use, reflecting firms' optimization in the face of higher potential productivity. 
B.   Estimates of Spillovers by Economic Distance 
  What mechanisms might explain the productivity gains estimated above? Section IA discussed 
some mechanisms that may be responsible for agglomeration spillovers. This subsection attempts to shed 
some light on the possible mechanisms by investigating how the estimated spillover effect varies as a 
function of economic distance.  
(i)  By Industry.  Table  7  shows  separate estimates from the baseline model for samples of 
incumbent plants in the MDP’s 2-digit industry and all other industries. In general, one might expect 
agglomeration spillovers to decline with economic distance (equation 5'). As a first pass, it is natural to 
explore whether spillovers are larger within an industry. While there can be substantial heterogeneity in 
technologies and labor forces among plants within a 2-digit SIC industry, only 16 of the 47 cases have 
incumbent plants in the MDP’s 2-digit industry. Thus, the research design and available data do not 
                                                                                                                                                             
large incumbents are left to hire labor and other inputs that are inferior in unobserved ways. On the other hand, we 
failed to find any significant differences when separately testing whether the productivity effect varied by the ratio 
of the MDP's output to county-wide manufacturing output, whether the MDP is owned by a foreign company, or 
whether the MDP is an auto company. 
32  The model suggests that firms should substitute away from labor and toward capital. The point estimates are not 
supportive of this prediction, though directly estimating changes in the capital/labor ratio gives imprecise estimates, 
making definitive conclusions unwarranted. 26 
 
permit a discrete analysis at finer industry definitions.
33
Column 1 of Table 7 reports estimates for all industries from Column (4) of Table 5, as a basis of 
comparison. Columns (2) and (3) report estimates from the baseline specification for incumbent plants in 
the MDP’s 2-digit industry and all other industries, respectively. The entries in these columns are from 
the same regression. As in Table 5, the numbers in square brackets convert the estimated percent changes 
into millions of 2006 dollars. 
 
The estimated changes are substantially larger in the MDP's own 2-digit industry. For example, 
the estimated increase in TFP for plants in the same 2-digit industry is a statistically significant 17% in 
Model 1 and a poorly determined 33% at τ = 5 in Model 2. In contrast, estimates for plants in other 
industries are a statistically insignificant 3.3% in Model 1 and marginally significant 8.9% in Model 2.  
  Figures 3 and 4 graph annual changes in TFP, providing 2-digit MDP industry and other industry 
analogues to Figure 1. The 2-digit MDP industry estimates are noisy due to the small sample size, which 
was also evident in the statistical results. Importantly, there is not evidence of differential trends in the 
years before the MDP’s opening and statistical tests confirm this visual impression. As in Figure 1, the 
estimated impact reflects the continuation of a downward trend in TFP in losing counties and a cessation 
of the downward trend in winning counties. 
  To probe the role of economic distance further, we identified an additional 10 "Million Dollar 
Plant" openings that were in the retail and wholesale trade sectors. These plants are part of the original 82 
MDP openings, but are not included in the main sample of 47 manufacturing MDP openings. Estimating 
equation (8) for these 10 trade sector MDP openings, we find TFP changes of -2.2% (2.9%) in Model 1 
and 4.9% (6.5%) in Model 2 (on a sample of 12105 plant-year observations in 31 counties). It appears 
that the non-manufacturing sector openings did not generate similar TFP increases, though the estimates 
in Model 2 are too imprecise to reject their equality with the baseline estimates. These findings provide 
further evidence that the spillovers are concentrated among plants that are economically close to the new 
plant.
34
                                                 
33 In the spirit of work by Bloom et al. (2007) and Jaffe (1986), we explore defining a continuous measure of 
technological overlap between industries. Lacking patent data, we define at the 3-digit SIC industry level: (1) the 
share of industrial output that is sold to each manufacturing industry and (2) the share of manufactured inputs that 
are received from each manufacturing industry. For each measure, we calculate the overlap between an incumbent 
firm's industry and the MDP industry by taking the product of those vectors. We then estimate equation (9), 
interacting the MDP effect with each measure of industrial overlap. There is evidence of differential spillovers based 
on overlap defined with inputs, but not with outputs. We suspect that overlap in plant output consumed by the 
manufacturing sector only is a poor reflection of overall industrial overlap, and are not confident that overlap in 
plant inputs is more persuasive. 
 
34 These results may also provide a test of whether the estimated spillovers are due to increased competition for 
inputs causing plants to move closer  to  their production possibility frontier. Specifically, these new  non-
manufacturing plants increase competition for land, labor, and other local inputs. The resulting increase in input 
prices may cause all plants (regardless of industry) to search for opportunities to increase productivity. In such a 27 
 
(ii) By Continuous Measures of Economic Distance. We now investigate the role of economic 
proximity more directly by using several measures of economic proximity that capture worker flows, 
technological proximity, and input-output flows (Table 2). To ease the interpretation, these economic 
proximity variables are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. In all cases, a 
positive value indicates a “closer” relationship between the industries.  
 Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
(9)     ln�𝑌𝑌 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � =𝗽𝗽1 ln�𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � + 𝗽𝗽2 ln�𝐾𝐾𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐵𝐵  � + 𝗽𝗽3 ln�𝐾𝐾𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐸𝐸  � + 𝗽𝗽4 ln�𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � + 𝗿𝗿1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
+ 𝜅𝜅1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜃𝜃1(1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟) × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜋𝜋1�1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 × 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�
+ 𝜋𝜋2�1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0) × 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� + 𝜋𝜋3�1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0) × 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝� + 𝗼𝗼𝑝𝑝
+ 𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 + 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
where Proximityij is a measure of economic proximity between the incumbent plant industry and the MDP 
industry. This equation is simply an augmented version of Model 1 that adds interactions of the proximity 
variables with 1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0), and (1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟) × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 . The coefficient of interest is 
π3, which is the coefficient on the triple interaction between the dummy for a winning county, the dummy 
for after the MDP opening, and the measure of proximity. This coefficient assesses whether plants in 
“closer” industries experience a greater increase in TFP after the MDP opening. A positive coefficient 
means that the estimated productivity spillover is larger after the MDP opening for incumbents that are 
geographically and economically close to the new plant, relative to incumbents that are geographically 
close but economically distant from the new plant (relative to the same comparison among incumbents in 
loser counties). A zero coefficient means that the estimated productivity spillover is the same for all the 
incumbents in a county, regardless of their economic proximity to the new plant. 
Table 8 reports estimates of π3 for 6 measures of economic proximity. The first 6 columns include 
the proximity measures one at a time. For example, column (1) reports that a one standard deviation 
increase in the CPS Worker Transitions variable between incumbent plants’ industry and the MDP’s 
industry is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the spillover. This finding is consistent with 
the theory that spillovers occur through the flow of workers across firms. One possibility is that new 
workers share ideas on how to organize production or information on new technologies that they learned 
with their previous employer. This measure tends to be especially high within 2-digit industries, so this 
finding was foreshadowed by the own 2-digit results in Table 7.  
In Columns (2), (3), and (4), the measures of intellectual or technological linkages indicate 
meaningful increases in the spillover. The precise mechanism by which these ideas are shared is unclear, 
                                                                                                                                                             
situation, all local plants would exhibit increased TFP. These results suggest that this mechanism does not explain 
this paper's primary findings. 
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although both the flow of workers across firms and the mythical exchange of ideas over beers between 
workers from different firms are possibilities. Notably, there is more variation in these measures within 2-
digit industries than in the CPS labor transitions measure.  
Columns (5) and (6) provide little support for the flow of goods and services in determining the 
magnitude of spillovers. Thus, the data fail to support the types of stories where an auto manufacturer 
encourages (or even forces) its suppliers to adopt more efficient production techniques. Recall, all plants 
owned by the MDP's firm are dropped from the analysis, so this finding does not rule out this channel 
within firms. The finding on the importance of labor and technology flows is consistent with the results in 
Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2009) and Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser (2002), while the finding on input and 
output flows stands in contrast with these papers’ findings. 
  In the column (7) specification, we include all the measures of economic proximity 
simultaneously. The labor flow, the citation pattern, and the technology input interactions all remain 
positive but are  statistically insignificant.  The  customer and supplier interactions  are negative and 
statistically insignificant.  
Overall, this analysis provides some support for the notion that spillovers occur between firms 
that share workers and between firms that use similar technologies. In terms of Section IC, this evidence 
is consistent with intellectual externalities, to the extent that they are embodied in workers who move 
from firm to firm, and to the extent that they occur among firms that use technologies that are reasonably 
similar. The estimates in Table 8 seem less consistent with the hypothesis that agglomeration occurs 
because of proximity to customers and suppliers. We caution against definitive conclusions, because the 
utilized measures are all imperfect proxies for the potential channels. Further, the possibility of better 
matches between workers and firms could not be directly tested with these data. 
 
C.   Firm Entry and Labor Costs as Indirect Tests of Spillovers 
  Baseline estimates found economically  substantial  productivity  gains for incumbent 
establishments following the opening of the new MDP. In the presence of positive spillovers, the model 
makes two empirical predictions that are explored in this subsection: increased firm entry and increased 
local input costs.  
First, if productivity spillovers are larger than short-run increases in the cost of local inputs, the 
MDP county  should experience entry by new firms (relative to losing counties).  Table  9  tests this 
prediction at the county level. The entries in Panel 1 come from regressions that use data from the Census 
of Manufactures, which is conducted every five years. The dependent variables are the log of the number 
of establishments (column 1) and the log of total manufacturing output (column 2) in the county. The 
sample is restricted to winning and losing counties, and all plants owned by MDP firms are excluded 29 
 
from both dependent variables. The covariates include county fixed effects, year fixed effects, case fixed 
effects, and an indicator for whether the observation is from after the MDP opening. The parameter of 
interest is associated with the interaction of indicators for an observation from a winning county and from 
after the MDP opening, so it is a difference-in-difference estimator of the impact of the MDP opening.
35
Column  (1)  reports that the number of manufacturing plants increased by roughly 12.5% in 
winning counties after the MDP opening. A limitation of this measure is that it assumes that all plants are 
of an equal size. The total value of output is economically more meaningful, because it treats an increase 
in output at an existing plant and a new plant equally. Column (2) reports that the opening of a MDP is 
associated with a 14.5% increase in total output in the manufacturing sector, although this is not estimated 
precisely.  
 
Overall, these results are consistent with estimated increases in TFP, as it appears that the MDP 
attracted new economic activity to the winning counties (relative to losing counties) in the manufacturing 
sector.
36
The second theoretical prediction is that, if spillovers are positive, the prices of local inputs will 
increase as firms compete for these factors of production. The most important locally supplied input for 
manufacturing plants is labor. This prediction is tested using individual-level wage data for winning and 
losing counties from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses of Population.
 Presumably, this new manufacturing activity located in the winning counties to gain access to the 
spillovers. 
37 These data are preferable 
to the measure of labor costs reported in the Census of Manufactures (i.e., the aggregate wage bill for 
production and non-production workers), which does not provide information on the quality of the labor 
force (e.g., education and experience). Specifically, we estimate changes in log wages, controlling for 
dummies for interactions of worker age and year, age-squared and year, education and year, sex and race 
and Hispanic and citizen, and case fixed effects. We also include indicators for whether the observation is 
from a winning county, occurs after the MDP opening, and the interaction of these two indicators.
38
                                                 
35 Because data is available every 5 years, depending on the Census year relative to the MDP opening, the sample 
years are 1 – 5 years before the MDP opening and 4 – 8 years after the MDP opening. Thus, each MDP opening is 
associated with one earlier date and one later date. Models are weighted by the number of plants in the county in 
years -6 to -10 and column 4 is weighted by the county’s total manufacturing output in years -6 to -10. 
 This 
interaction is the focus of the  regression and is an adjusted difference-in-difference estimator of the 
36 It is possible that the MDP’s spillovers extended beyond manufacturing. In this case, it might be reasonable to 
expect increased entry in other sectors too. 
37 The sample is limited to individuals who worked last year, worked more than 26 weeks, usually work more than 
20 hours per week, are not in school, are at work, and who work for wages in the private sector. One important 
limitation of the Census data is that they lack exact county identifiers for counties with populations below 100,000. 
Instead, it is possible to identify PUMAs in the Census, which in rural areas can include several counties. This 
introduces significant measurement error, which is partly responsible for the imprecision of the estimate. 
38 The pre-period is defined as the most recent census before the MDP opening. The post-period is defined as the 
most recent census 3 or more years after the MDP opening. Thus, the sample years are 1 – 10 years before the MDP 
opening and 3 – 12 years after the MDP opening.   30 
 
impact of the MDP opening on wages. This equation is analogous to the Model 1 version of equation (8). 
Column (3) in Panel 2 of Table 9 reports that wages increase by 2.7% in winning counties after 
the MDP opening, after adjusting for observable individual  heterogeneity.  This effect appears 
quantitatively sizable and is marginally statistically significant. Multiplying the estimated 2.7% wage 
increase by the average labor earnings in winning counties implies that the quality-adjusted annual wage 
bill for employers in all industries increased by roughly $151 million after the MDP opening. This finding 
is consistent with positive spillovers and an upward sloping labor supply curve, perhaps due to imperfect 
mobility of labor (as in Section I).  
It is possible to use the estimated increase  in wages to make some back of the envelope 
calculations of the MDP’s impact on incumbent plants’ profits. Recall, the Model 1 result in Table 5 
indicated an increase in TFP of approximately 4.8% (we focus on Model 1 because it is impossible to 
estimate a version of Model 2 with the decennial population Census data). If we assume that workers are 
homogenous or that high and low skill workers are perfectly substitutable in production, then the labor 
market-wide increase in wages applies throughout the manufacturing sector.  In our sample, labor 
accounts for roughly 23% of total costs, so the estimated 2.7% increase in skill adjusted wages implies 
that manufacturers’ costs increased by approximately 0.62%.  The increased production costs due to 
higher wages are therefore 13% of the gain in TFP. 
These calculations demonstrate that the gains in TFP do not translate directly to profits due to the 
higher costs of local inputs. Since the prices and quality of other inputs are not observable, it is not 
possible to determine the total increase in production costs. Further, we expect the wage increase to be 
larger for plants and industries that experience TFP increases as plants enter or expand and compete for 
workers with the skills relevant for these sectors. For these reasons, this back of the envelope calculation 
should be interpreted as a lower bound of the increase in input costs. In the long run, an equilibrium 
requires that the total impact on profits is zero. 
 
VI. Validity and Robustness 
Our main empirical finding in Section V is that MDP openings are associated with a substantial 
average increase  in TFP among incumbent plants in those  counties, relative to incumbent plants in 
counties that narrowly missed receiving the new plants. The validity of this research design is supported 
by the similarity of pre-trends in TFP (Figure 1) and the balancing of many ex-ante observable 
characteristics of winning and losing counties and their incumbent plants (Table 3). Nevertheless, the 
possibility remains that the paper’s identifying assumption is invalid and that incumbent plants in winning 
counties experienced unobserved positive productivity shocks coincident to the new plant’s opening.  
Consequently, this section explores the robustness of the estimates to various specifications, and 31 
 
investigates several possible alternative interpretations of the estimated spillover effects. Specifically, this 
section analyzes (i) the role of functional form assumptions, unobserved industry and regional shocks, and 
weighting; (ii) the general endogeneity of plant inputs; (iii) unobserved changes in inputs; (iv) attrition; 
(v) declining plant TFP and mismeasurement; and (vi) changes in the price of plant output. 
(i) Functional Form, Industry and Regional Shocks,  and  Weighting.  Table  10  reports 
estimates from a series of specification checks. As a basis for comparison, column (1) reports the results 
from the preferred specification in column (4) of Table 5. 
We begin by generalizing our assumption on plants' production technology. Estimates in Table 5 
assume a Cobb-Douglas technology. In column (2) of Table 10, inputs are modeled with the translog 
functional form.  Column (3) is based on a Cobb-Douglas technology but allows the effect of each 
production input to differ at the 2-digit SIC level.  This model accounts for possible differences in 
technology across industries, as well as for possible differences in the quality of inputs used by different 
industries. For example, it is possible that even if technology were similar across different manufacturers, 
some industries use more skilled labor than others. Column (4) allows the effect of the inputs to differ in 
winning/losing counties and before/after the MDP opening.  
Columns (5) and (6) add census division by year fixed effects and census division by year by 2-
digit industry fixed effects. These specifications aim to purge the spillover effects of unobserved region-
wide shocks or region by industry shocks to productivity that might be correlated with the probability of 
winning a MDP (e.g., a declining Rust Belt).  
Until this point, we have presented results based on specifications that weight observations by the 
square root of the plant's total value of shipments 8 years prior to the MDP opening. As discussed above, 
the resulting estimates measure the change in productivity per average dollar of output, which reflects the 
full economic impact of the plant.  Nevertheless,  Column (7)  reports  the results from unweighted 
regressions that reveal the change in productivity for the average plant. For Model 1, the estimated change 
is 1.46% (1.07%); for Model 2, the estimated change is 0.65% (2.81%).  These findings should be 
interpreted cautiously because the building capital coefficient becomes slightly negative in both models, 
which may be a sign of misspecification. If this concern is set aside, the results indicate that the spillovers 
are concentrated among the largest plants.
39
  Taken together, the results in Table 10  are striking. The weighted  estimates appear to be 
insensitive to the specific functional form of the production function.  None of the specifications 
 A promising avenue for future research is to explore why 
smaller plants fail to benefit from the new plant’s presence. 
                                                 
39 In unweighted regressions, the estimated effect among incumbent plants in the largest decile (8 years prior to the 
MDP opening) is:  2.90% (3.12%) higher than the average effect of 1.16% (0.98%) for Model 1; and 16.7% (11.0%) 
higher than the average effect of -1.16% (3.04%) for Model 2. 32 
 
contradict the findings from the baseline specification in Table 5. Although many of the estimates are 
smaller than the baseline ones, the magnitude of the decline is modest. For example, they are all within 
one standard error of the baseline estimate in both Models 1 and 2. Overall, these results fail to undermine 
the conclusion from Table 5 that the opening of a MDP leads to a substantial increase in TFP among 
incumbent plants and this is consistent with theories of spillovers.
40
(ii) General Endogeneity of Inputs. An important conceptual concern is that capital and labor 
inputs should be treated as endogenous, because the same forces that determine output also determine a 
firm’s optimal choice of inputs (Griliches and Mairesse 1995). Unlike the usual estimation of production 
functions, our aim is the consistent estimation of the spillover parameters, θ1 and θ2, so the endogeneity of 
capital and labor is only relevant to the extent that it results in biased estimates of these parameters. This 
subsection employs the productivity literature’s techniques to control for the endogeneity of capital and 
labor to assess this issue’s relevance in this paper’s setting. 
 
We employ three main approaches, and the results are collected in Appendix Table 1. First, in 
columns (2) and (3), we calculate TFP for each plant by fixing the parameters on the inputs at the relevant 
input’s share of total costs (van Biesebroeck 2004; Syverson 2004; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 
2007). This method may mitigate any bias in the estimation of the parameters on the inputs associated 
with unobserved demand shocks. In these two columns, the cost shares are calculated at the plant level 
and the 3-digit SIC industry level over the full sample, respectively.  
  Second, Columns (4) through (6) present estimates based on methodologies that build on work by 
Olley and Pakes (1996). These methods are based on the result that, under certain conditions, adjustment 
for investment or intermediate inputs (e.g., materials) will remove the correlation between input levels 
and unobserved shocks to output. Column (4) controls for 4th degree polynomial functions of log capital 
and log investment, and the interaction of both functions (separately for both types of capital). Column (5) 
includes the same controls as Column (4), but replaces investment with materials; an alternative proposed 
by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Building on Column (5), Column (6) includes interactions between log 
labor and log materials, as colinearity may complicate the estimation of the labor coefficient (Ackerberg, 
Caves, and Frazer, 2006). 
  Third, Column (7) presents estimates that instrument for current input levels with lagged changes 
in inputs; a technique proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The increase in each input from 𝑝𝑝 = −2 to 
𝑝𝑝 = −1 may predict input levels at 𝑝𝑝 = 0, but may not be correlated with unobserved output shocks in 
𝑝𝑝 = 0.  Indeed, the estimated first-stage results (not shown) have the expected sign, and Column (7) 
                                                 
40 We also tested whether the results are sensitive to the choice of the date of the MDP opening. When we use the 
year that the plant is first observed in the SSEL as the MDP opening date, Model 1 estimates a change of 5.23% 
(2.39%) and Model 2 estimates a change of 11.2% (5.57%). When we use the year of the MDP article for the 
opening date, Model 1 estimates a change of 4.58% (2.45%) and Model 2 estimates a change of 4.88% (4.21%).  33 
 
reports the 2SLS results. Of course, it is a strong assumption that this lagged change is not otherwise 
correlated with output and we have used only the first lagged change due to potential weak instrument 
bias. 
  Appendix Table 1 also reports coefficients from the production function, as a way of assessing 
the effectiveness of the production function estimation.  The typical endogeneity concern is that 
unobserved productivity shocks lead to changes in variable inputs (labor) but not fixed inputs (capital), so 
the estimated effect of capital is downward biased and loaded onto labor. In the baseline specification, all 
inputs are positive and statistically significant,  and the labor coefficient is an expected 72% of the 
summed coefficients for labor and capital.
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  Overall, the estimated changes in TFP are consistent with the findings from the baseline 
specification. This exercise fails to suggest that the possible endogeneity of labor and capital is the source 
of the estimated productivity spillovers.
 The overall production function has mild decreasing returns 
to scale, with a 1% increase in all inputs leading to a 0.86% increase in output. 
42
  (iii) Unobserved Changes in Inputs. The input measures in the ASM are not comprehensive of 
all inputs that affect plant output. Further, the available data may not adequately measure the degree of 
input usage or the quality of inputs. Consequently, it is possible that the estimated spillovers reflect 
changes in unobserved inputs, unobserved usage, and/or input quality. This subsection explores these 
possibilities. 
 
State and local governments frequently offer substantial subsidies to new manufacturing plants to 
locate within their jurisdictions. These incentives can include tax breaks, worker training funds, the 
construction of roads, and other infrastructure investments. It is possible that these investments benefits 
firms other than the MDP. For example, the construction of a new road intended for a MDP may also 
benefit the productivity of some of the incumbent firms (Chandra and Thompson 2000).  If the 
productivity gains we have documented are due to public investment, then it is inappropriate to interpret 
them as evidence of spillovers.  
To investigate this possibility, we estimated the effect of MDP openings on government total 
capital expenditures and government construction expenditures with data from the Annual Survey of 
Governments. In models similar to equation (8), we find that the opening of a MDP is associated with 
statistically insignificant increases in capital and construction expenditures. In most specifications the 
estimated impact of a MDP opening is negative and statistically insignificant. Even in the specifications 
that produce positive insignificant estimates, there is no plausible rate of return that could generate a 
                                                 
41 As a basis of comparison, the weighted cost shares are 70.9% for materials, 23.2% for labor, 3.98% for machinery 
capital, and 1.84% for building capital, among plants the year before the MDP opening. 
42 Note that the basic findings in Table 7 are robust to the specification changes in Table 10 and Appendix Table 1. 34 
 
meaningful portion of the productivity gains in winning counties. Based on these measures of public 
investment, it seems reasonable to conclude that public investment cannot explain the paper’s results. 
  Incumbent plants may respond to the MDP opening by increasing the intensity of their capital 
usage.  If winning counties had been depressed and the capital stock was used below capacity, then 
incumbent plants might increase production simply by operating their capital stock closer to capacity. As 
an indirect test of this possibility, we estimated whether the MDP opening affected the ratio of the dollar 
value of energy usage (which is increasing in the use of the capital stock) to the capital stock. In models 
identical to the version of equation (8) used in Table 6, we find small and insignificant changes in this 
measure. This finding suggests that greater capital capacity utilization is unlikely to be the source of 
estimated productivity spillovers. 
The results could also be influenced by unobserved changes in labor quality, though the direction 
of this bias is unclear. If the MDP poaches good workers from incumbent plants, the quality of the 
workforce in existing plants may decline. If the MDP receives bad workers from incumbent plants or the 
opening attracts higher quality workers to the county, then incumbent plants may upgrade the quality of 
their workforce. Since the specifications control for the number of hours worked by production and non-
production workers, but not for their quality, this would lead to an underestimate or overestimate of the 
true TFP change for incumbent plants.   
(iv) Attrition of Sample Plants. If the MDP increases competition for inputs and raises local 
input prices, as suggested by the estimated changes in quality-adjusted wages, this might encourage plants 
with declining TFP to close.  Indeed, for a variety of reasons,  differential attrition in the sample of 
incumbent plants in winning and losing counties could contribute to the measured differential in 
productivity trends among survivors after the MDP opening. This attrition could either result from plants 
shutting down operations or from plants continuing operations but dropping out of the group of plants that 
are surveyed with certainty as part of the ASM.
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The available evidence suggests that differential attrition is unlikely to explain the finding of 
spillovers in winning counties. Similar numbers of winning and losing plants remained in the sample at its 
end: 72% in winning counties and 68% in losing counties (i.e., the number of plants at τ = 5 as a fraction 
of the number of plants at τ = 0). The slightly larger attrition rate in losing counties is consistent with the 
paper’s primary result. Specifically, one seemingly reasonable interpretation of this result is that the MDP 
opening allowed some winning county plants to remain open that would have otherwise closed. Thus to 
the extent that a MDP opening keeps weakening plants operating, the baseline analysis will underestimate 
  
                                                 
43 Recall, establishments are sampled with certainty if they are part of a company with manufacturing shipments 
exceeding $500 million or their total employment was at least 250.  35 
 
the overall TFP increase.
44
Within aggregate attrition numbers, the MDP might change the mix of existing firms. If the MDP 
increases input prices for all plants and disproportionally increases productivity for plants in some 
industries, then we might expect to see increased agglomeration of those plants in each MDP location. 
This is an intriguing hypothesis, but difficult to test in this setting because such attrition may only occur 
in the long-run (more than 5 years). Within the same 2-digit SIC as the MDP, 71% of incumbents in 
winning counties and 69% in losing counties remained in the sample at τ = 5. 
 
(v) Declining Plant TFP and Mismeasurement. Table 4 and Figure 1 show that incumbent 
plant TFP was declining prior to the MDP opening in both winning and losing counties, and in losing 
counties after the MDP opening. This finding is striking, as productivity generally increases over time in 
the overall economy. Here, we explore whether it affects the interpretation of the results and conclude that 
it does not. 
The decline in TFP is not necessarily inconsistent with rising TFP in the overall economy. Recall, 
the sample is restricted to a set of large and aging manufacturing plants that appear continuously in the 
ASM in the 8 years prior to the MDP opening. Further, the specifications include both plant and industry-
by-year fixed effects. The estimated decline in TFP from this specification and sample will miss the 
process of creative destruction where less productive plants are replaced by more productive plants.
45
The estimated downward trend appears to be a general phenomenon for similar samples of plants 
in all US counties, and is not limited to winning and losing counties. From our analysis of randomly 
selected manufacturing plant openings in the US (Table 5, Column 5), the TFP of incumbent plants 
declined annually by 0.5% prior to the opening. Further, we find declining TFP among similar plants in 
all US counties over the 6-year periods following the MDP openings. Specifically, we created a sample of 
all US plants that appear in the ASM for 14 straight years, deflated output and materials by the CPI, and 
regressed log output on log capital stocks (building and machinery, created using the same permanent 
inventory method), log labor hours, log materials, plant fixed effects, industry fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, and weighted the regression by plant output. The estimated year effects report average changes in 
TFP over each year, and we calculated average changes in TFP over 6-year periods that correspond to the 
periods following MDP openings.
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44 The null hypothesis of equal trends in TFP among attriting plants in winning and losing counties prior to the MDP 
opening cannot be rejected; the TFP trend in winning counties minus the TFP trend in losing counties was -0.0052 
(0.0080). Further, the estimation of equation (8) on the sample of plants that is present for all years from -7 to +5 
yields results that are qualitatively similar to those from the full sample. 
 Over these periods, we find that TFP declined in all US counties by 
45 Moreover, we note that our sample overlaps the late 1970s and early 1980s, which was a period of poor economic 
performance and low productivity. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2000) have documented that within plant 
productivity growth is cyclical, and is particularly low during downturns. 
46 For example, if there was one MDP opening in 1987, the period 1987 to 1993 received a weight of 1/47. 36 
 
an average of 4.7% (with a standard error of 0.4%). In other words, the pre-MDP opening TFP changes 
among large and aging plants in our sample of winning and losing counties (and post-MDP opening 
changes in losing counties) are similar to TFP changes among large and aging plants throughout the US. 
An alternative explanation is that measured declines in TFP are a statistical artifact that reflects 
measurement error, particularly in the construction of capital stocks. Following standard practice in the 
existing literature, we construct capital stocks based on depreciating plants' past inputs and adding 
deflated investments in new capital.
47
Such measurement problems are unlikely to affect our main results of interest, as this bias need 
not affect the relative comparison of firm TFP in winning and losing counties.  For it to affect our 
estimates, measurement of capital stocks (or other inputs) would need to be systematically biased in 
winning counties after the MDP opening. The previous robustness checks provide some reassurance on 
this issue: from Table 10, Column (3) allows input effects to vary by industry and Column (4) allows 
input effects to vary after the MDP opening or in winning counties (but not the interaction of those two). 
Further, the specifications in Appendix Table 1 would be affected differently by measurement error in 
capital stocks, but all show TFP increases in winning counties after the MDP opening. 
 This procedure uses standard NBER depreciation rates, but if these 
rates are too low for firms in our sample then aging firms will begin to have more measured capital than 
they have in reality. Mechanically, this will make firms' TFP appear to decline in firm age. Because the 
regressions control for industry-by-year and plant fixed effects, TFP changes are estimated solely on 
aging plants. Similar biases would appear if firms' labor or materials became unobservably worse as 
plants aged. 
(vi) Changes in the Price of Plant Output. Another concern is that the theoretically correct 
dependent variable is the quantity of output. However, due to the data limitations faced by virtually all of 
the productivity literature, the dependent variable in our models is the value of output or price multiplied 
by quantity. Consequently, it is possible that the estimated spillover effect reflects higher output prices, 
instead of higher productivity.  
  We do not expect this to be a major factor in our context.  The sample is comprised of 
manufacturing establishments that generally produce goods traded outside the county.
48
                                                 
47 This is necessary in the later portions of the sample, when book values for current capital are no longer reported. 
 In the extreme 
case of a perfectly competitive industry that produces a nationally traded good, output prices would not 
48 To give an indication of the tradability of goods produced by firms in a given industry we use data by detailed 
industry code on the average distance travelled by a good between production and consumption (Weiss 1972). 
Across all sample plants, the 10th centile is 239 miles, 25th centile is 355 miles, median is 466 miles, 75th centile is 
602 miles, and 90th centile is 722 miles. This suggests that most establishments in our sample produce goods that 
are widely traded outside the county. Across all industries in the Weiss data, distance varies between 52 and 1337 
miles, with a mean of 498. Examples of regional industries are: hydraulic cement, iron and steel products, metal 
scrap and waste tailings, ice cream and related frozen desserts, and prefabricated wooden buildings. 37 
 
increase disproportionally in a county that experienced increased demand.
49
  To explore this possibility further, we examine whether the  productivity change is larger in 
industries that are more regional or more concentrated. We estimate a Model 1 version of equation (8) 
that interacts 1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 , 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0)𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, and (1(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑟𝑟) × 1(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 0))𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 , with incumbents’ industry-
specific measure of average distance traveled by output between production and consumption. We also 
estimate this regression with a measure of incumbents' industry concentration.
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  Earlier estimates found that the estimated spillovers were not larger for incumbent industries that 
tend to ship products to the MDP industry; a context in which output price effects might be largest. 
Further, the opening of a non-manufacturing MDP might have similar effects on demand for incumbent 
plants' output, particularly since these non-manufacturing MDPs were in the retail and wholesale trade 
sectors. However, these non-manufacturing MDPs did not lead to similar estimated TFP increases. These 
exercises suggest that output price increases are not the source of the estimated spillover effects. 
 These specifications do 
not find that estimated changes are larger in more local or more concentrated industries; in fact, there is 
some evidence for larger effects on incumbent plants that ship their products further. 
 
VII. Interpretation 
The preferred Model 2 estimates suggest that incumbent plants' total factor productivity increased 
by 12% following the opening of a Million Dollar Plant, while Model 1 estimates find a 5% increase. The 
12% TFP increase implies an additional $430 million in annual county manufacturing output five years 
after the MDP opening. In this Section, we discuss how to interpret this large effect and what it implies 
for the spatial distribution of economic activity.  
To put the magnitude of the estimated spillover effect in perspective, we calculate the fraction of 
overall variation in average manufacturing productivity explained by the MDP opening.  There is a 
tremendous amount of cross-sectional variation in productivity across US counties in the manufacturing 
sector. For example, the county at the 90
th percentile of the TFP distribution has average TFP that is 56% 
higher than the county at the 10
th percentile, indicating that plants located in counties at the top of the 
distribution are 56% more productive that similar plants located in counties at the bottom of the 
distribution, holding constant all production inputs.
51
                                                 
49 Similarly, input (labor) spillovers may be less pronounced for incumbent plants that produce nationally traded 
goods (Black et al., 2005). 
 A 12% increase in TFP is equivalent to moving 
50 The information on distance is from Weiss (1972). The information on industry concentration is from the Bureau 
of Census (“Concentration Ratios”, 2002). 
51  Specifically, these numbers are obtained using cross-sectional plant-level data from the 1987 Census of 
Manufactures (the mid-point of our sample period). We regress log output on log inputs (log building capital, log 
machinery capital, log materials, log labor) and a full set of county fixed effects. We then look at the distribution of 
the county fixed effects, which represent the average TFP among all manufacturing firms in a given county.  38 
 
from the 10th percentile of the county-level TFP distribution to the 27th percentile; alternatively, it is 
equivalent to a 0.6 standard deviation increase in the distribution of county TFP. Attracting a MDP is a 
major event for these counties, and we find this implied shift in the relative standing of counties large but 
not unrealistic. 
Our  estimates have interesting implications for the distribution of economic activity across 
locations. Along with substantial increases in TFP, increased firm entry and expansion suggests that 
profits increased, at least in the short-run. However, the documented increase in TFP does not translate 
necessarily as  a similarly  large increase in profits for incumbent firms. Increased  economic activity 
generated by the MDP leads to firms bidding up local factor prices like labor and land. Difference-in-
difference estimates found that wage rates increased by 2.7%, compared to TFP increases of 4.8% in the 
difference-in-difference Model 1 (we are unable to estimate a trend break model for skill-adjusted wages 
because we have to rely on decennial Census data). Since this is a county-wide increase in labor costs, 
incumbent firms that do not receive a spillover may become less profitable. 
If labor costs increase equally for all incumbents and the productivity gains are larger for plants 
that are more similar to the new plant, there might be long-run agglomeration of similar plants in each 
MDP location. This is important, because it helps explain the existence of industrial clusters, a pervasive 
feature of the spatial distribution of economic activity.  It seems unlikely, however, that industries 
receiving  larger spillovers would fully agglomerate around MDPs.  While there is a  great deal of 
documented cross-sectional agglomeration and coagglomeration, we expect that local wages rise by more 
than 2.7% for the  particular workers demanded by such industries.  Indeed,  despite experiencing 
substantially larger TFP increases, there is no evidence of incumbent plants in winning counties and the 
same 2-digit SIC staying open in the sample more than winning incumbent plants in other industries. 
In interpreting the magnitude of our estimates, three points need to be highlighted. First, it is 
inappropriate to interpret the estimated increase in TFP as the partial equilibrium impact of the "Million 
Dollar Plant" opening, holding constant everything else in the county’s economy. Instead, it reflects the 
impact of the plant opening and all other associated changes. For example, other new plants opened in the 
county following the MDP opening and overall manufacturing output increased (Table 10). Consequently, 
the TFP estimates should be interpreted as a general equilibrium reduced-form effect that combines both 
the direct impact of the MDP and the impacts of subsequent new plants and expanded output from 
incumbent plants. 
Second, the effect of a MDP opening is not representative of the typical plant opening. The MDPs 
differ from the average manufacturing plant in several respects, most importantly size. MDPs are 
significantly larger than the average new plant in the US. Moreover, they are a selected sample. Unlike 
most manufacturing plants, the MDPs generated bidding from local governments, presumably because 39 
 
there was an ex-ante expectation of substantial positive spillovers. If spillovers vary by industry, then it 
may be important to note that MDPs tend to be in the automotive, chemical, computer, and electronics 
industries (relative to the average manufacturing plant opening). 
Third, the counties bidding for plants may be those that would particularly benefit from a new 
manufacturing plant opening. We do not expect that winners and losers were great counties that almost 
attracted special plants; rather, they were counties willing to provide tax subsidies for industrial stimulus. 
In considering potential locations, the MDPs might be attracted to a declining manufacturing sector and 
the expectation of lower future wages. 
These estimates of agglomeration spillovers come from a selected set of plants and set of counties 
for which we expect large spillovers, which implies that our estimates are a likely upper bound (and 
perhaps substantially so). This is an issue of external validity, rather than the consistency of our estimates. 
However, our estimates are representative of the benefits generated by large plants bid on by these local 
governments, which is a population of interest for public policy. From a research standpoint, finding 
spillovers from MDPs appears to be a necessary condition for agglomeration spillovers from a broader set 
of plants (rather than a sufficient condition) and a call for further research. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
This paper makes three main contributions, conditional on the validity of our research design. 
First, the estimates document substantial increases in TFP among incumbent plants following the opening 
of "Million Dollar Plants." This is consistent with firms agglomerating in certain localities, at least in part, 
because they are more productive for being close to other firms. 
Second, the estimates shed light on the channels that underlie the estimated spillovers. Estimated 
spillovers are larger between plants that share labor pools and similar technologies. This is consistent with 
intellectual externalities, to the extent that they occur among firms that use similar technologies or are 
embodied in workers who move between firms. Additionally, this finding is consistent with higher rates 
of TFP due to improved efficiencies of worker-firm matches. Clearly, our evidence on this regard is just 
an initial step. Further research is needed to understand in more detail the sources of agglomeration 
economies.  
Third, firms appear to pay higher costs in order to receive these productivity spillovers. Spatial 
equilibrium requires that increases in TFP are accompanied by increases in local input prices, so that 
firms are generally indifferent across locations. The finding of higher prices for quality-adjusted labor is 
consistent with this prediction. The increased levels of economic activity reflects increased demand to 
locate in the winning county, which leads to higher local prices and a new equilibrium.  
These results have some surprising policy implications. A standard critique of local governments 40 
 
providing subsidies to new plants to locate within their jurisdictions is that it may be rational for the 
locality but it is welfare decreasing for the nation because it is a zero sum game where localities bid away 
all the benefit of attracting a new plant (see, for example, Glaeser, 2008). This conclusion rests on the 
assumption that the benefits of attracting a new plant are homogeneous.  
However, when the benefits of attracting a new plant are heterogeneous - as found in this case - it 
is possible that competition among localities results in efficiency gains. The finding of large spillovers 
may justify local subsidies, even from a national perspective. Specifically, the MDP cannot capture these 
spillovers on its own and consequently might choose a location where its costs are low but the spillovers 
are minimal. However, the socially efficient outcome is for these plants to locate where the sum of their 
profits and the spillovers are greatest. In this setting, national welfare is maximized when payments are 
made to plants that produce the spillovers so that they internalize this externality in making their location 
decision.  
It is also important to bear in mind that the estimated 12% gain in TFP is an average effect. As 
Figure 2 demonstrated, there is substantial variability. For example, the estimated impact is negative in 
40% of the cases. Risk-adverse local governments may be unwilling to provide tax incentives with this 
distribution of outcomes. 
This paper has demonstrated that tests for the presence of spillovers can be conducted by directly 
measuring TFP.  These tests can serve as an important complement to the  measurement of 
coagglomeration rates that may reflect spillovers, cost shifters, or natural advantages. In this spirit, it is 
important to determine whether impacts on TFP are evident outside the manufacturing sector. Further, the 
significant  heterogeneity in  estimated spillovers across cases and the variation in estimates across 
industries underscore that there is still much to learn about the structural source of these spillovers.  41 
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Figure 1. All Incumbent Plants' Productivity in Winning vs. Losing Counties, Relative to 
the Year of a MDP Opening 
 
All Industries: Winners vs. Losers 
 
 
 
Difference: Winners – Losers 
 
 
Notes: These figures accompany Table 4. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Case-Specific Mean Shift Estimates, Following a MDP Opening 
 
Notes: The figure reports results from a version of Model 1 that estimates the parameter θ1 for each of the 47 MDP 
cases. The figure reports only 45 estimates because two cases were excluded for Census confidentiality reasons.  
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Figure 3. Incumbent Plants' Productivity in the MDP's 2-Digit Industry, Winning vs. 
Losing Counties, Relative to the Year of a MDP Opening 
 
2-digit MDP Industry: Winners Vs. Losers 
 
 
 
Difference (Winners – Losers) 
 
 
Notes: These figures accompany Table 7, Column 2 (MDP’s 2-digit Industry).
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Figure 4. Incumbent Plants' Productivity in Other Industries (not the MDP's 2-Digit 
Industry), Winning vs. Losing Counties, Relative to the Year of a MDP Opening 
 
Other Industries: Winners Vs. Losers 
 
 
 
Difference (Winners – Losers) 
 
 
Notes: These figures accompany Table 7, Column 3 (All 2-digit Industries, except the MDP’s 2-digit Industry). 
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Table 1. The “Million Dollar Plant” Sample 
  (1) 
Sample MDP Openings¹:   
Across All Industries  47 
Within Same 2-digit SIC  16 
   
Across All Industries:   
Number of Loser Counties per Winner County:   
   1  31 
   2+  16 
   
Reported Year – Matched Year: ²   
   -2 to -1  20 
   0  15 
   1 to 3  12 
   
Reported Year of MDP Location:   
   1981 – 1985  11 
   1986 – 1989  18 
   1990 – 1993  18 
   
MDP Characteristics, 5 years after opening:³   
  Output ($1000)  452801 
  (901690) 
  Output, relative to county output 1 year prior  0.086 
(0.109) 
  Hours of Labor (1000)  2986 
  (6789) 
¹ Million Dollar Plant openings that were matched to the Census data and for which there were incumbent plants in 
both winning and losing counties that are observed in each of the eight years prior to the opening date (the opening 
date is defined as the earliest of the magazine reported year and the year observed in the SSEL.) This sample is then 
restricted to include matches for which there were incumbent plants in the Million Dollar Plant’s 2-digit SIC in both 
locations. 
² Only a few of these differences are 3. Census confidentiality rules prevent being more specific. 
³ Of the original 47 cases, these statistics represent 28 cases. A few very large outlier plants were dropped so that the 
mean would be more representative of the entire distribution (those dropped had output greater than half of their 
county’s previous output and sometimes much more). Of the remaining cases: most SSEL matches were found in 
the ASM or CM but not exactly 5 years after the opening date; a couple of SSEL matches in the 2xxx-3xxx SICs 
were never found in the ASM or CM; and a couple of SSEL matches not found were in the 4xxx SICs. The MDP 
characteristics are similar for cases identifying the effect within same 2-digit SIC. Standard deviations are reported 
in parentheses. All monetary amounts are in 2006 US dollars. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Measures of Industry Linkages 
    Mean   
                      Measure of 
Industry Linkage  Description  All Plants 
Only 1
st 
Quartile 
Only 4
th 
Quartile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Labor Market Pooling:         
CPS Worker 
Transitions 
Proportion of workers leaving a job 
in this industry that move to the 
MDP industry (15 months later) 
0.119  0.002  0.317  0.249 
Intellectual or Technology Spillovers:         
Citation pattern  Percentage of manufactured industry 
patents that cite patents manufactured 
in MDP industry 
0.022  0.001  0.057  0.033 
Technology 
Input 
R&D flows from MDP industry, as a 
percentage of all private sector 
technological expenditures 
0.022  0.000  0.106  0.084 
Technology 
Output 
R&D flows to MDP industry, as a 
percentage of all original research 
expenditures 
0.011  0.000  0.042  0.035 
Proximity to Customers and Suppliers:         
Manufacturing 
Input 
Industry inputs from MDP industry, 
as a percentage of its manufacturing 
inputs 
0.017  0.000  0.075  0.061 
Manufacturing 
Output 
Industry output used by MDP 
industry, as a percentage of its output 
to manufacturers 
0.042  0.000  0.163  0.139 
Notes: CPS Worker Transitions was calculated from the frequency of worker industry movements in the rotating 
CPS survey groups. This variation is by Census Industry codes, matched to 2-digit SIC. The last 5 measures of 
cross-industry relationships were provided by Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2009). These measures are defined in a 3-
digit SIC by 3-digit SIC matrix, though much of the variation is at the 2-digit level. In all cases, more positive values 
indicate a closer relationship between industries. Column 1 reports the mean value of the measure for all incumbent 
plants matched to their respective MDP. Column 2 reports the mean for the lowest 25% and column 3 reports the 
mean for the highest 25%. Column 4 reports the standard deviation across all observations. The sample of plants is 
all incumbent plants, as described for Table 1, for which each industry linkage measure is available for the 
incumbent plant and its associated MDP. These statistics are calculated when weighting by the incumbent plant’s 
total value of shipments eight years prior to the MDP opening. 
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Table 3. County & Plant Characteristics by Winner Status, One Year Prior to a “Million Dollar Plant” Opening 
  All Plants  Within Same Industry (2-digit SIC) 
                                                                    Winning 
Counties 
Losing 
Counties 
All US 
Counties 
(1) – (2) 
t-stat 
(1) – (3) 
t-stat 
Winning 
Counties 
Losing 
Counties 
All US 
Counties 
(6) – (7) 
t-stat 
(6) – (8) 
t-stat 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
# of Counties  47  73        16  19       
County Characteristics:                     
  Total Per-capita Earnings ($)  17,418  20,628  11,259  -2.05  5.79  20,230  20,528  11,378  -0.11  4.62 
                     
    % Change, over last 6 years  0.074  0.096  0.037  -0.81  1.67  0.076  0.089  0.057  -0.28  0.57 
                     
  Population  322,745  447,876  82,381  -1.61  4.33  357,955  504,342  83,430  -1.17  3.26 
                     
    % Change, over last 6 years  0.102  0.051  0.036  2.06  3.22  0.070  0.032  0.031  1.18  1.63 
                     
  Employment-Population ratio  0.535  0.579  0.461  -1.41  3.49  0.602  0.569  0.467  0.64  3.63 
                     
    Change, over last 6 years  0.041  0.047  0.023  -0.68  2.54  0.045  0.038  0.028  0.39  1.57 
                     
  Manufacturing Labor Share  0.314  0.251  0.252  2.35  3.12  0.296  0.227  0.251  1.60  1.17 
                     
    Change, over last 6 years  -0.014  -0.031  -0.008  1.52  -0.64  -0.030  -0.040  -0.007  0.87  -3.17 
                     
# of Sample Plants  18.8  25.6  7.98  -1.35  3.02  2.75  3.92  2.38  -1.14  0.70 
Plant Characteristics:                     
  Output ($1000)  190,039  181,454  123,187  0.25  2.14  217,950  178,958  132,571  0.41  1.25 
                   
    % Change, over last 6 years  0.082  0.082  0.118  0.01  -0.97  -0.061  0.177  0.182  -1.23  -3.38 
                   
  Hours of labor (1000s)  1,508  1,168  877  1.52  2.43  1,738  1,198  1,050  0.92  1.33 
                   
    % Change, over last 6 years  0.122  0.081  0.115  0.81  0.14  0.160  0.023  0.144  0.85  0.13 
                   
Notes: For each case to be weighted equally, counties are weighted by the inverse of their number per-case. Similarly, plants are weighted by the inverse of their 
number per-county multiplied by the inverse of the number of counties per-case. The sample includes all plants reporting data in the ASM for each year between the 
MDP opening and eight years prior. Excluded are all plants owned by the firm opening a MDP. Also excluded are all plants from two uncommon 2-digit SIC 
values so that subsequently estimated clustered variance matrices would always be positive definite. The sample of all United States counties excludes winning 
counties and counties with no manufacturing plant reporting data in the ASM for nine consecutive years. These other United States counties are given equal weight 
within years and are weighted across years to represent the years of MDP openings. Reported t-statistics are calculated from standard errors clustered at the county 
level. All monetary amounts are in 2006 US dollars. 51 
 
Table 4. Incumbent Plant Productivity, Relative to the Year of a MDP Opening 
Event Year  In Winning 
Counties 
In Losing 
Counties 
Difference 
(1) – (2) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
τ = -7  0.067  0.040  0.027 
  (0.058)  (0.053)  (0.032) 
τ = -6  0.047  0.028  0.018 
  (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.023) 
τ = -5  0.041  0.021  0.020 
  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.025) 
τ = -4  -0.003  0.012  -0.015 
  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.024) 
τ = -3  0.011  -0.013  0.024 
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
τ = -2  -0.003  0.001  -0.005 
  (0.027)  (0.011)  (0.028) 
τ = -1  0  0  0 
       
τ = 0  0.013  -0.010  0.023 
  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.019) 
τ = 1  0.023  -0.028  0.051* 
  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.023) 
τ = 2  0.004  -0.046  0.050 
  (0.036)  (0.046)  (0.033) 
τ = 3  0.003  -0.073  0.076+ 
  (0.047)  (0.057)  (0.043) 
τ = 4  0.004  -0.072  0.076* 
  (0.053)  (0.062)  (0.033) 
τ = 5  -0.023  -0.100  0.077* 
  (0.069)  (0.067)  (0.035) 
       
R-squared  0.9861   
Observations  28732   
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the county level.  Columns 1 and 2 report coefficients from the same 
regression: the natural log of output is regressed on the natural log of inputs (all worker hours, building capital, 
machinery capital, materials), year x 2-digit SIC fixed effects, plant fixed effects, case fixed effects, and the reported 
dummy variables for whether the plant is in a winning or losing county in each year relative to the MDP opening. 
When a plant is a winner or loser more than once, it receives a dummy variable for each incident. Plant-year 
observations are weighted by the plant’s total value of shipments eight years prior to the MDP opening. Data on 
plants in all cases is only available 8 years prior to the MDP opening and 5 years after.  Capital stocks were 
calculated using the permanent inventory method from early book values and subsequent investment. The sample of 
incumbent plants is the same as in columns 1 – 2 of Table 3. ** denotes significance at 1% level, * denotes 
significance at 5% level, + denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 5. Changes in Incumbent Plant Productivity Following a MDP Opening 
  All Counties  MDP Counties  All Counties 
  MDP Winners –  
MDP Losers 
MDP Winners –  
MDP Losers 
Random 
Winners 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Model 1:           
 Mean Shift    0.0442+    0.0435+    0.0524*    0.0477*   - 0.0496** 
  (0.0233)  (0.0235)  (0.0225)  (0.0231)  (0.0174) 
        [$170m]   
           
 R-squared  0.9811  0.9812  0.9812  0.9860  ~0.98 
 Observations 
  (plant x year) 
418064  418064  50842  28732  ~400000 
Model 2:           
 Effect after 5 years    0.1301*    0.1324*     0.1355**    0.1203*  -0.0296 
  (0.0533)  (0.0529)  (0.0477)  (0.0517)  (0.0434) 
        [$429m]   
           
   Level Change  0.0277  0.0251  0.0255  0.0290  0.0073 
  (0.0241)  (0.0221)  (0.0186)  (0.0210)  (0.0223) 
   Trend Break    0.0171+    0.0179*    0.0183*    0.0152+  - 0.0062 
  (0.0091)  (0.0088)  (0.0078)  (0.0079)  (0.0063) 
   Pre-trend  - 0.0057  - 0.0058  - 0.0048  - 0.0044  - 0.0048 
  (0.0046)  (0.0046)  (0.0046)  (0.0044)  (0.0040) 
           
 R-squared  0.9811  0.9812  0.9813  0.9861  ~0.98 
 Observations 
  (plant x year) 
418064  418064  50842  28732  ~400000 
         
Plant & Ind-Year FEs  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Case FEs  NO  YES  YES  YES  N/A 
Years Included  All  All  All  -7 ≤ τ ≤ 5  All 
Notes: The table reports results from fitting several versions of equation (8). Specifically, entries are from a regression of the 
natural log of output on the natural log of inputs, year x 2-digit SIC fixed effects, plant fixed effects, and case fixed effects. In 
Model 1, two additional dummy variables are included for whether the plant is in a winning county 7 to 1 years before the 
MDP opening or 0 to 5 years after. The reported mean shift indicates the difference in these two coefficients, i.e., the average 
change in TFP following the opening. In Model 2, the same two dummy variables are included along with pre- and post-trend 
variables. The shift in level and trend are reported, along with the pre-trend and the total effect evaluated after 5 years. In 
columns (1), (2), and (5), the sample is composed of all manufacturing plants in the ASM that report data for 14 consecutive 
years, excluding all plants owned by the MDP firm. In these models, additional control variables are included for the event 
years outside the range from τ = -7 through τ = 5 (i.e., -20 to -8 and 6 to 17). Column (2) adds the case fixed effects that 
equal 1 during the period that τ ranges from -7 through 5. In columns (3) and (4), the sample is restricted to include only 
plants in counties that won or lost a MDP. This forces the industry-year fixed effects to be estimated solely from plants in 
these counties. Incumbent plants are now required to be in the data only when the MDP opens and all 8 years prior (not also 
for 14 consecutive years, though this does not change the results). For column (4), the sample is restricted further to include 
only plant-year observations within the period of interest (where τ ranges from -7 to 5). This forces the industry-year fixed 
effects to be estimated solely on plant by year observations that identify the parameters of interest. In column (5), a set of 47 
plant openings in the entire country were randomly chosen from the ASM in the same years and industries as the MDP 
openings (this procedure was run 1000 times and reported are the mean and standard deviation of those estimates). For all 
regressions, plant-year observations are weighted by the plant’s total value of shipments eight years prior to the opening. 
Plants not in a winning or losing county are weighted by their total value of shipments in that year. All plants from two 
uncommon 2-digit SIC values were excluded so that estimated clustered variance-covariance matrices would always be 
positive definite. In brackets is the value in 2006 US dollars from the estimated increase in productivity: the percent increase 
is multiplied by the total value of output for the affected incumbent plants in the winning counties. Reported in parentheses 
are standard errors clustered at the county level. ** denotes significance at 1% level, * denotes significance at 5% level, + 
denotes significance at 10% level. 53 
 
Table 6. Changes in Incumbent Plant Output and Inputs Following a MDP Opening 
  Output  Worker 
Hours 
Machinery 
Capital 
Building 
Capital 
Materials 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Model 1: Mean Shift     0.1200**    0.0789*  0.0401    0.1327+    0.0911** 
  (0.0354)  (0.0357)  (0.0348)  (0.0691)  (0.0302) 
           
Model 2: After 5 years   0.0826+  0.0562  - 0.0089  - 0.0077  0.0509 
  (0.0478)  (0.0469)  (0.0300)  (0.0375)  (0.0541) 
Notes:  The table reports results from fitting versions of equation (8) for each of the indicated 
outcome variables (in logs). See the text for more details. Standard errors clustered at the county level 
are reported in parentheses. ** denotes significance at 1% level, * denotes significance at 5% level, + 
denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 7. Changes in Incumbent Plant Productivity Following a MDP Opening, For 
Incumbent Plants in the MDP’s 2-Digit Industry and All Other Industries  
  All Industries 
 
MDP’s 
2-digit Industry 
All Other 
2-Digit Industries 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Model 1:       
 Mean Shift    0.0477*    0.1700*  0.0326 
  (0.0231)  (0.0743)  (0.0253) 
  [$170m]  [$102m]  [$104m] 
       
 R-squared  0.9860  0.9861 
 Observations  28732  28732 
Model 2:       
 Effect after 5 years    0.1203*  0.3289    0.0889+ 
  (0.0517)  (0.2684)  (0.0504) 
  [$429m]  [$197m]  [$283m] 
       
 Level Change  0.0290      0.2814**  0.0004 
  (0.0210)  (0.0895)  (0.0171) 
 Trend Break    0.0152+  0.0079    0.0147+ 
  (0.0079)  (0.0344)  (0.0081) 
 Pre-trend  - 0.0044  -0.0174  - 0.0026 
  (0.0044)  (0.0265)  (0.0036) 
       
 R-squared  0.9861  0.9862 
 Observations  28732  28732 
Notes: The table reports results from fitting versions of equation (8). As a basis for comparison, Column 1 reports 
estimates from the baseline specification for incumbent plants in all industries (baseline estimates for incumbent 
plants in all industries (Column 4 of Table 5). Columns 2 and 3 report estimates from a single regression, which 
fully interacts the winner/loser and pre/post variables with indicators for whether the incumbent plant is in the same 
2-digit industry as the MDP or a different industry. Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the 
county level. The numbers in brackets are the value (2006 US $) from the estimated increase in productivity: the 
percent increase is multiplied by the total value of output for the affected incumbent plants in the winning counties. 
** denotes significance at 1% level, * denotes significance at 5% level, + denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Table 8. Changes in Incumbent Plant Productivity Following a MDP Opening, by Measures of Economic Distance Between the 
MDP's Industry and Incumbent Plant's Industry 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
CPS Worker Transitions      0.0701**                 0.0374 
(0.0237)            (0.0260) 
               
Citation pattern        0.0545**          0.0256 
  (0.0192)          (0.0208) 
               
Technology Input        0.0320+        0.0501 
    (0.0173)        (0.0421) 
               
Technology Output            0.0596**      0.0004 
      (0.0216)      (0.0434) 
               
Manufacturing Input          0.0060    - 0.0473 
        (0.0123)    (0.0289) 
               
Manufacturing Output            0.0150  - 0.0145 
               (0.0196)  (0.0230) 
               
R-squared  0.9852  0.9852  0.9851  0.9852  0.9851  0.9852  0.9853 
Observations  23397  23397  23397  23397  23397  23397  23397 
Notes: The table reports results from fitting versions of equation (9), which is a modified from equation 8. Building on the Model 1 specification in Column 4 of 
Table 5, each column adds interaction terms between winner/loser and pre/post status with the indicated measures of how an incumbent plant’s industry is linked 
to its associated MDP’s industry (a continuous version of results in Table 8). These industry linkage measures are defined and described in Table 2, and here the 
measures are normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The sample of plants is that in Column 4 of Table 5, but it is restricted to plants 
that have industry linkage data for each measure. For assigning this linkage measure, the incumbent plant’s industry is held fixed at its industry the year prior to 
the MDP opening. Whenever a plant is a winner or loser more than once, it receives an additive dummy variable and interaction term for each occurrence. 
Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the county level. ** denotes significance at 1% level, * denotes significance at 5% level, + denotes 
significance at 10% level. 56 
 
Table 9. Changes in Counties' Number of Plants, Total Output, and Skill-Adjusted Wages 
Following a MDP Opening 
  Panel 1 
(Census of Manufactures) 
Panel 2 
(Census of Population) 
  Dependent Variable: 
Log(Plants) 
Dependent Variable:  
Log(Total Output) 
Dependent Variable: 
Log(Wage) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Difference-in-Difference    0.1255*  0.1454     0.0268+ 
  (0.0550)  (0.0900)   (0.0139) 
       
R-squared  0.9984  0.9931  0.3623 
Observations   209  209  1057999 
Notes: The table reports results from fitting three regressions. In Panel 1, the dependent variables are the log of 
number of establishments and the log of total manufacturing output in the county, based on data from the Census of 
Manufactures.  Controls include county, year, and case fixed effects. Reported are the county-level difference-in-
difference estimates for receiving a MDP opening. Because data are available every 5 years, depending on the Census 
year relative to the MDP opening, the sample years are defined to be 1 – 5 years before the MDP opening and 4 – 8 
years after the MDP opening. Thus, each MDP opening is associated with one earlier date and one later date. The 
column (1) model is weighted by the number of plants in the county in years -6 to -10 and the column (2) model is 
weighted by the county’s total manufacturing output in years -6 to -10. 
  In Panel 2, the dependent variable is log wage and controls include dummies for age*year, age-squared*year, 
education*year,  sex*race*Hispanic*citizen, and case fixed effects.  Reported is the county-level difference-in-
difference estimate for receiving a MDP opening. Because data are available every 10 years, the sample years are 
defined to be 1 – 10 years before the MDP opening and 3 – 12 years after the MDP opening. As in Panel 1, each MDP 
opening is associated with one earlier date and one later date. The sample is restricted to individuals who worked last 
year, worked more than 26 weeks, usually work more than 20 hours per week, are not in school, are at work, and who 
work for wages in the private sector. The number of observations reported refers to unique individuals – some IPUMS 
county groups include more than one FIPS, so all individuals in a county group were matched to each potential FIPS. 
The same individual may then appear in more than one FIPS and observations are weighted to give each unique 
individual the same weight. Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the county level. ** denotes 
significance at 1% level, * denotes significance at 5% level, + denotes significance at 10% level. 57 
 
Table 10. Changes in Incumbent Plant Productivity Following a MDP Opening, Robustness to Different Specifications  
  Baseline 
specification 
Translog 
functional 
form 
Input - 
industry 
interactions 
Input-
winner, 
input-post 
Region - 
Year FE 
Region - 
Year - 
Industry FE 
Unweighted 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
               
Model 1: Mean Shift    0.0477*    0.0471*    0.0406+    0.0571*    0.0442+    0.0369+  0.0146 
  (0.0231)  (0.0226)  (0.0220)  (0.0245)  (0.0230)  (0.0215)  (0.0107) 
               
Model 2: After 5 years    0.1203*    0.1053+    0.0977*    0.1177*    0.1176*    0.0879*  0.0065 
  (0.0517)  (0.0535)  (0.0487)  (0.0538)  (0.0520)  (0.0442)  (0.0281) 
Notes: The table reports results from fitting several versions of equation (8). Column 1 reports estimates from the baseline specification (Column 4 of Table 5). 
Column 2 uses a translog functional form for inputs. Column 3 allows the effect of each input to differ by 2-digit SIC. Column 4 allows the effect of inputs to 
differ in winning/losing counties and before/after the MDP opening. Column 5 includes region (9 census divisions) by year fixed effects. Column 6 includes 
region by year by industry fixed effects. Column 7 reports on an unweighted version of equation (8). Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the 
county level. ** denotes significance at 1% level, * denotes significance at 5% level, + denotes significance at 10% level.   58 
Appendix Table 1. Changes in Incumbent Plant Productivity Following a MDP Opening (and Production Function 
Coefficients for Plant Inputs), Robustness to Specifications Adjusting for the Endogeneity of Plant Inputs 
  Baseline 
specification 
Fixed Input 
Cost Shares: 
plant level 
Fixed Input 
Cost Shares: 
SIC-3 level 
Inv-Cap 
Interactions 
Mat-Cap 
Interactions 
Mat-Cap & 
Mat-Labor 
Interactions 
IV Inputs, 
Lagged 
Change 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Model 1               
Mean Shift    0.0477*  0.0364  0.0325    0.0391+    0.0399+    0.0354+    0.0613* 
  (0.0231)  (0.0228)  (0.0241)  (0.0222)  (0.0216)  (0.0208)  (0.0250) 
                  Building Capital    0.0384*  -  -  -  -  -  0.0205 
  (0.0152)            (0.0731) 
  Equipment Capital      0.0771**  -  -  -  -  -    0.0856* 
  (0.0218)            (0.0364) 
  Labor      0.2915**  -  -      0.2660**      0.2891**  -      0.2197** 
  (0.0290)      (0.0249)  (0.0270)    (0.0448) 
  Materials      0.4504**  -  -      0.4284**  -  -      0.4359** 
  (0.0218)      (0.0279)      (0.0436) 
Observations  28732  28732  28732  18856  28732  28732  23992 
Model 2               
After 5 years    0.1203*  0.0971  0.0938+  0.0839    0.1004*    0.0869+  0.1135 
  (0.0517)  (0.0656)  (0.0538)  (0.0527)  (0.0487)  (0.0480)  (0.0695) 
                  Building Capital    0.0393*  -  -  -  -  -  0.0215 
  (0.0169)            (0.0727) 
  Equipment Capital      0.0790**  -  -  -  -  -    0.0899* 
  (0.0149)            (0.0371) 
  Labor      0.2925**  -  -      0.2668**      0.2903**  -      0.2217** 
  (0.0284)      (0.0245)  (0.0262)    (0.0448) 
  Materials      0.4510**  -  -      0.4300**  -  -      0.4348** 
  (0.0217)      (0.0280)      (0.0438) 
Observations  28732  28732  28732  18856  28732  28732  23992 
Notes: The table reports results from fitting several versions of equation (8). Column 1 reports estimates from the baseline specification (Column 4 of Table 5), 
and the estimated coefficients on each plant production input (logs). Column 2 reports estimates when fixing the coefficient on each plant's inputs to be its 
average cost share over the sample period, where per-period capital costs were calculated from capital rental rates using BLS data. Column 3 reports estimates 
when fixing the coefficient on each plant's inputs to be the average cost share for all plants in its 3-digit SIC. Column 4 controls for 4th degree polynomial 
function of log capital and log investment, and the interaction of both functions (separately for both types of capital; see Olley and Pakes 1996). Column 5 
includes the same controls as Column 4, but replaces log investment with log materials (see Levinsohn and Petrin 2003). Column 6 adds interactions between 
log materials and log labor to the controls in Column 5 (see Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer 2006). Column 7 instruments for each input with the lagged change 
in input from 2 years prior to 1 year prior, dropping the first two years of data for each plant (see Blundell and Bond 1998). Reported in parentheses are 
standard errors clustered at the county level. ** denotes significance at 1% level, * denotes significance at 5% level, + denotes significance at 10% level. 